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STATE OF WASHINGTON 
Moore, 
v. 
CONFEDERATED BANDS AND 
TRIBES OF THE YAKIMA 
INDIAN NATION Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U. S.C. 
§ 1254(2) from theCA 9's decision holding that the Washington 
statute which partially 'extends the State's criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian reservations violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. FACTS: Public Law 83-280, enacted by Congress in 
1953, provided for the immediate assumption of jurisdiction over 
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Indians and Indian reservations by five States. The act gave 
other States, including Washington, the option of assuming 
jurisdiction, provided certain conditions were first met. 
Under the authority of this act, Washington in 1957 enacted 
RCW § 37.12 which allowed a tribe or its governing body to adopt 
a resolution petitioning the State to assume civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over it, whereupon the governor was to issue a pro-
clamation confirming the assumption. 
In 1963 the legislature amended that statute in such a r 
manner as to provide for a division of jurisdiction over Indians 
into two broad categories: (1) jurisdiction assumed with the 
consent of the affected tribes; and (2) jurisdiction assumed 
without tribal consent. In the first category the State assumed 
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian reservations to the same 
extent that it exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction elsewhere 
in the State. In the second category Washington assumed juris-
diction to the fullest extent permissible with respect to land 
within a reservation held in fee (i.e., not tribal lands and not 
held in trust or subject to a restriction against alienation.) 
As for non-fee lands within a reservation occupied by a tribe 
that had not consented, the State assumed jurisdiction only in 
eight subject-matter categories: compulsory school attendance, 
public assistance, domestic relations, mental illness, juvenile 
delinquency, adoption proceedings, dependent children, and 
operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets and highways. 
The non-consenting tribes were left free to seek and obtain a 
-3-
complete assumption of state jurisdiction by petition. This 
statute thus results in what it referred to as a "checkerboard" 
assumption of jurisdiction. The assumption is partial in the 
following respects: 1) less than all of the reservations with-
in the State may consent to the State's jurisdiction; 2) within 
a reservation that has not consented, the State's full assump-
tion of jurisdiction may apply to only some of the geographic 
territory; and 3) within the non-fee lands of a non-consenting 
reservation the assumption of subject matter jurisdiction is 
only partial. 
The Yakimas, who have never petitioned for the State's 
assumption of full jurisdiction over them, are located within a 
reservation in Yakima County. The reserv<tion has approximately 
1,400,000 acres, of which all but approximately 270,000 are l1eld 
in trust or restricted status by the United States. Out of the 
total reservation population of about 25,000, only 3,000 are 
members of the Yakima Indian Nation. Within the reservation are 
two essentially non-Indian towns, Wapato and Toppenish, whose 
land is a~ost entirely owned in fee. 
The Yakimas brought a declaratory judgment action in the 
DC, seeking a declaration that Washington's assumption and 
exercise of jurisdiction over them and their reservation was 
invalid on both constitutional and statutory grounds. They con-
tended that RCW § 37.12 violated the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Article XXVI of the Washington Constitution, and Public Law 
83-280; in the alternative they sought a declaration that the 
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jurisdiction assumed and exercised by the State was non-
exclusive and concurrent with federal and tribal jurisdiction. 
The DC, after conducting a trial on the questions, dismissed 
the complaint, finding that the statute violated neither the 
state nor federal constitutions nor Public Law 83-280. He also 
found that state jurisdiction was exclusive rather than concur-
rent. 
On appeal, after a panel of the CA 9 had heard argument, 
the case was en banced for a determination of whether Public 
Law 83-280 authorized Washington to assume partial ju~isdiction. 
The majority of the court, in an opinion by Judge Sneed, conclud-
ed that the court's prior decision in Quinault Tribe of Indians 
v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 644 (CA 9 1966), supported the State's 
argument that partial assumption was permissible under PL 83-280 
and further concluded that the decision was correctly decided 
and should be adhered to. The dissenting opinion, writ.ten by 
Judge Hufstedler, was of the view that PL 83-280 did not permit 
the partial geographic and subject matter assumption that the 
Washington statute prescribed. The case was then remanded to 
the panel for consideration of the remaining issues. 
On remand the panel held that the statute violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. Focusing on the classification based 
on the status of title to the land upon which an alleged crim-
inal offense occurs, the court found no rational basis support-
ing it. TheCA 9 said that the State's interest in enforcing 
. 
t · criminal law is no less fundamental or overriding on non-fee 
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lands than on fee lands and that no showing had been made that 
the happenstance of title holding is related in any way to the 
need by the land occupants for law enforcement. The court con-
cluded that this checkerboard jurisdictional structure based on 
a selection by land title was the very kind of arbitrary legis-
lative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. Finding 
that the invalid portion of the statute could not be severed from 
the rest, the court struck down the entire statute. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The State argues that there is a rational 
basis for its checkerboard assumption scheme in that the 
legislature sought to apply the law equally to all citizens 
while preserving a maximum of tribal self-government. It con-
tends that the legislature merely recogni?.ed the reality of land 
ownership patterns within reservations and decided to treat 
non-Indian (or fee) lands just as if they were located outside 
the reservation, while treating the remaining lands as the real 
reservation. In connection with these truly Indian lands, the 
legislature gave the tribes a choice: they could either have full 
state jurisdiction by petitioning the governor or they could keep 
the lands subject to federal and tribal control, with the 
exception of certain subject-matter areas vital to the State. 
The eight enumerated categories were ones in which the legisla-
ture determined that the State had a fundamental concern for the 
welfare of its people. The State contends that in adopting this 
checkerboard scheme the legislature recognized the strong 
historical and cultural link between the concept of tribal 
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self-government and Indian land ownership and thus did not act 
arbitrarily or irrationally. 
In response the Yakimas point out that the practical 
impact of theCA 9's decision is to relieve the State of a law 
enforcement function that it has shown itself to be unwilling 
or unable to carry out and to provide the Yakima Nation and the 
federal government with the opportunity to provide adequate law 
and order on the reservation. They contend that the justifica-
tion for the statute that the State now asserts 
gested in the courts below and that in any case 
was not sug-
n~ 
it does provide 
A 
a rational basis for the drawing of distinctions based on land 
title within the reservation. Contending that the decision 
below is clearly correct and that it will be limited in its 
effect, they urge the Court to summarily affirm. 
4. DISCUSSION: The decision below seems sufficiently 
questionable to warrant plenary consideration. In light of the 
State's argument concerning the reasons that the legislature 
adopted the checkerboard scheme, I find it difficult to conclude 
-----------that the distinctions drawn were totally arbitrary and irra-
tional. Because of the Dept of Interior's role in Indian affairs, 
it might be helpful to solicit the views of the SG. 
There is a motion to affirm 
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Re: 77-388 - State of Washington v. Confederated 
Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation 
Is this form of order acceptable? 
"Probable jurisdiction is noted. The parties are 
directed to address the following issue: 
'Whether the partial geographi c and subject 
matter jurisdiction exercised by the State of 
Washington within the Yakima Indian Reservation 
pursuant to Public Law 280 violates either the 
statutory requirements of Public Law 280 or the 
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.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
February 23, 1978 
Re: No. 77-388 - State of Washin on v. Confed-




Your proposed order seems fine t.e-me. 
~ 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
,. 
' 
February 23, 1978 
No. 77-388 State of washington v. 
Dear John: 
Confederated Bands and Tribes of 
the Yakima Indian Nation 
Your proposed order is fi.ne with me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr . Justice Stevens 
lfp/s·s 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM~ ?c..D ?'dU.•i.. ~~e~..U.~ . 
../~,.e.c ~~dl~U~~ 
To: Justice Powell ~cF;,~ ~"' L.r~~ 
f/1'~ • ~ c~~~+-e..c~
Re: No. 77-388, Washington v. Yakima Indian Tribe~c~""-
d~-· This case is difficult because the language an ~~~~ 
-- I 5""'~-
legislative history of the statute are unclear. But the ...>~ 
~
underlying problem is clear enough. In 1953, Conqress ena  
P.L. 280, authorizing states with Indian lanc'ls within thei ~·~ 
borders to assume jurisdiction over such lands; consent of ~~~ 
Indians affected was not necessary. Enactment of P.L. 280 ar~~ 
the apogee of assimilationist policy towards the Indians. ~ 
In 1963 the State of Washinqon asserted jurisdiction 
over the Yakima Indians without their consent. Under the terms 
. 
' 
of the assumption of jurisdiction, the State extended fuJl civil 
and criminal jurisdiction to Indians and Indian lands, with the 
proviso that State jurisdiction over Indians when on their tribaJ 
lands or allotted lands within a reservation would only extend to 
eight narrowly defined social welfare and traffic safety areas. 
The State also provided that upon the request of any tribe, the 
State would assume full jurisdiction over the tribe and its 
lands. 
In 1968 Congress made a siqnificant chanqe in its policyM -- -towards the Indians, abandoning the assimiJationist policy of the lAA... 
14/, !' 
earlier law by amending p. L. 280 to permit States to assert -:fJ..l. '2-YIJ 
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands only with the cons~
- · 1-r:>~~ 
of the Indians affected. Congress did not invalidate, however, -ur--
prior unilateral assertions of jurisdiction. This has left the~ 
Yakimas doubly aggreived, not only by the unilateral assertion ~ 
jurisdiction but also by its survival after repudiation by ~~~ 
Congress of the policy underlying it. Goldberg, Public Law 280, 
22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 535, 544 (1975). Further exacerbatinq the 
situation, according to Judge Hufstedler's dissent from the CA 
9's en bane decision, is the fact that the state law enforcement 
effort has been ineffective because of the patchwork jurisdiction 
and the limited resources devoted to the task. 
A decision invalidating Washington's prP.sent 
jurisdictional statute on any ground wouJd rectify this anomalous 
situation. To reassert jurisdiction over the Yakimas under 
current law (25 U.S.C. §1321(a)), the State would have to secure 
their consent. The Yakimas urge three qrounds for the invalidity 
of Washington's assertion of jurisdiction. 
I. The Disclaimer Issue 
A. The Question: Is Washington's assertion of 
jurisdiction invalid because the State never amended Article XXVI 
of its Constitution to remove the disclaimer of jurisdiction over 
Indian land contained therein? 
B. Federal Law Governs: The statehood enabJinq act of 
1889 required that the disclaimer be embodied in the State's 
constitution. Section 6 of P.L. 280 authorized the amendment of 
the State constitution to remove the disclaimer. Section 6 
provides in part, 
"That the provisions of this Art shall 
not become effective with respect to such 
assumption of jurisdiction by any such 
State until the people thereof have 
appropriately amended their State 
constitution or statutes as the case may 
be." 
The compliance of the State with the requirements of ~6 is a 
question of fedeal law. The ruling by the Washington Supreme 
Court approving amendment by simple legislative action is 
unassailable as a matter of state law but obviously doAs not 
settle the federal question. 
C. The Case May Be Decided on this Ground: The State 
argues that the question the Court asked the parties to adoress 
does not include the disclaimer issue. 
"Whether the partial geographic and 
subject matter jurisdiction exercised by 
the State of Washington within the Yakima 
Indian Reservation pursuant to Public Law 
280 violates either the statutory 
requirements of Public Law 280 or the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 
In the view of the State, the question framed by the Court 
focuses on the statutory and constitutional validity of the 
assertion of partial jurisdiction, while the disclaimer argument 
is an objection to any assertion of jurisdiction that is not 
preceded by amendment of the State's constitution. 
The SG responds that the Court's question includes any 
violation by the State of the "statutory requirements of Public 
Law 280." The SG points out that the question as framed by the 
Court is drawn almost verbatim from the SG's Memorandum on the I 
Jurisdictional Issue. In that memorandum, the SG suggested that 
the Court consider the disclaimer issue. 
The State also argues that previous summary decisions of 
this Court have settled the disclaimer issue. Of the cases cited 
by the State on this point, only Comenout v. Bur0en, 525 P.2d 217 
(Wash. 1974), app. dfwsfg, 420 U.S. 915 (1975), presented the 
disclaimer issue. A previous ruling entered without plenary 
consideration does not foreclose full consideration of the issue 
at a later time. E.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 
u.s. 1, 14 (1976). 
D. The Merits of the Disclaimer Issue: State 
jurisdiction over Indian lands may be asserted only by leave of 
the United States. Antoine v. Washington, 420 u.s. 194, 205 
(1975). The compliance of the State with the conditions imposed 
by Congress on State jurisdiction is essential to the validity of 
the State's jurisdiction. 
Both sides support their positions by reference to the 
language of §6 of P.L. 280. The State arques that §6 only 
applies to States in which constitutional or statutory amendments 
are necessary to remove "any legal impediment" to the assumption 
of civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian land. 
All legal impediments, it points out, have been removed by the 
State's legislative action asserting jurisdiction over the 
Yakimas, because the State's highest court has held that only 
legislative action is necessary to override the disclaimer 
contained in Article XXVI of the State's constitution. The State 
also argues that the language of ~6 does not require amPndment of 
the State constitution by popular referendum simply because of 
the reference to "the people" of the State. The section also 
appears to refer to amendment of statutes by "the people" of the 
State, but, the State insists, surely Congress contemplated 
amendment of statutes by the normal state legislative process. 
By the same token, State law should define the acceptable process 
under §6 for amendment of the disclaimer provision of the State 
Constitution. 
The Yakimas, on the other hand, insist that ~6 clearly 
requires amendment of the State constitution by "the people" of 
the State, and that this requirement has not been met in 
Washington. Not only has there been no amendment by popular 
referendum, as is called for by the Washington constitution, but 
also there has been no purported amendment by any other process. 
Instead, the State legislature simply enacted a statute asserting 
the jurisdiction at issue in this case. Turning the State's 
argument against the State, the Yakimas aJso argue that just as 
Congress must have contemplated amendment of State statutes by 
normal legislative processes, it must have contemplated 
constitutional amendments by normal procedures, i.e., by popular 
referendum. 
Both sides agree that the legislative history of ~6 
shows that Congress thought that the Washington constitution, 
Art. XXVI, would have to be amended before the State could assert 
------------------------------------jurisdiction over Indian lands. The State argues, however, that 
in providing for the amendment of State constitutions in §6, the 
Congress thought that it was accommodating requirements of State 
law, not federal law. And, the State asserts, Congress was 
clearly mistaken about the requirements of Washington law when it 
supposed that a constitutional amendment was nec~ssary. The 
passages from the legislative history cited by the State, 
however, fail to support the State's full position. They show 
that in providing for amendment of State statutes in addjtion to 
State constitutions, the Congress had in mjnd State law 
requirements as defined by State courts. But with reqard to thP 
amendment of State constitutions, the weight of the legislative 
history appears to tip towards the view that Congress was 
modifying a federal law requirement when it enacted ~6. 
As the Yakimas see it, the controlling legislative view 
of this issue was expressed succinctly by Representative Dawson. 
"Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman, then we qet 
right back to your objection. Congress 
does not have to give consent to a state 
to amend its constitution or its laws. 
"Mr. Dawson. Because when the Enabling 
Act was passed, they said thjs state can 
become a state upon certain conditions, 
except for the Enabling Act. In other 
words, we restrict what they can put in 
their laws and constitution to begin 
with. The state cannot go any further 
than their Government lets them go when 
they become a state, so now we are 
lifting one of those restrictions." 
The statehood enabling act provided that the disclaimer in the 
Washington constitution should be "irrevocable without the 
consent of the United States and the people of said States 
[including Washington]." The same language was incorporated in 
Article XXVI of the Washington constitution. The Washington 
Supreme Court has held that the language in the Washjnaton 
constitution does not require amendment of Article XXVI by 
popular referendum. But that holding does not control or alter 
the meaning of the requirement in the enabling act that the 
disclaimer be altered only by the people of the State, and it was 
this requirement that Congress reenacted in P.L.280, §6. On this 
view, regardless of what State law requires for the amendment of 
the disclaimer provision, federal law as embodied in the enabling 
act and P.L. 280 require amendment by the people of the State. 
In support of this view of P.L. 280, the Yakimas cite McClanahan 
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1972). The question in 
McClanahan was whether Arizona could impose an income tax on an 
Indian who lived on a reservation and had income only from 
reservation sources. In marshalling the reasons supportinq the 
conclusion that Arizona had no such jurisdiction, the Court cited 
P.L. 280, as amended, as evidence that only by such explicit and 
special exceptions to the general rule could States assume 
jurisdiction over Indians on Indian land. 
"Finally, it should be noted that 
Conqress has now provided a method 
whereby States may assume jurisdiction 
over reservation Indians. Title 25 
u.s.c. §1322(a) grants the consent of the 
United States to States wishing to assume 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
reservation Indians, and 25 U.S.C. §1324 
confers upon the States the riqht to 
disregard enablinq acts which limit their 
authority over such Indians. But the Act 
expressly provides that the State must 
act 'with the consent of the tribe 
occupying the particular Indian country", 
25 U.S.C. ~1322(a), and must 
'appropriately [amend] its constitution 
or statutes.' 25 U.S.C. §1324. Once 
aqain, the Act cannot be read as 
expressly conferring tax immunity on 
Indians. But we cannot believe that 
Congress would have required the consent 
of the Indians affected and the amendment 
of those state constitutions which 
~rohibit the assumption of jurisdiction 
1f the States were free to accomplish the 
same goal unilaterally by simple 
legislative enactment." 
411 U.S. at 177-78 (footnotes omitted). 
In reply to this argument by the Yakimas, the State 
suggests that the only purpose of the requirements imposed by ~6 
is to ensure that federal jurisdiction and responsibility will 
not lapse before there is some positive expression of willinqness 
on the part of the State to assume jurisdiction over Indian 
lands. I doubt that the language of §6 can bear that 
interpretation, and I am sure that the State has cite~ nothjnq in 
the legislative history to support this interpretation of ~6. 
On balance, I would resolve this question in favor of 
the Yakimas. The language of the enabling act appears to require 
alteration of the disclaimer by the people of the State. P.L. 
280 takes this view of the enabling act and as a consequence 
requires amendment by ordinary procedures (popular referendum) as 
a condition of assertion of jurisdiction by the State. This is a 
requirement of federal law established in the Anablinq act and 
reiterated in P.L. 280, and the State has no power to assume 
jurisdiction without complying with the condition. The languaqe 
of §6 fairly bears this construction. 
The State objects that there is no good reason for 
Congress to require popular amendment of the disclaimer if statP 
law allows legislative amendment. The SG speculates that 
Congress may have required popular referendum bPcause of the 
significant burdens and tensions associated with State 
jurisdiction over Indian lands, but this is only speculation. It 
seems more likely to me that the reenactment of the requirement 
in P.L. 280 is an echo of the constitutional theory embodied in 
the Enabling Act. That act provided for the people of the 
Territory of Washington to elect delegates to a constitutionaJ 
convention that would draft a proposed constitution for the new 
State. That proposed constitution, necessarily containinq the 
disclaimer clause called for by the enabling act, was then to be 
submitted to the people of the Territory at a referendum. For 
the same reason that popular approval was necessary to enact the 
new constitution, it was necessary to aJter the terms of the 
constitution, including the disclaimer; hence the enabling act 
required that the disclaimer be irrevocable without the consent 
of the people. Public Law 280 preserves the requirement 
originally imposed by the enabling act. 
E. Practical Consequences of a Decision for the Yakimas 
on the Disclaimer Issue: The invalidation of Washington's 
assertion of jurisdiction over the Yakimas, based on the 
disclaimer issue, would invalidate all assertions of ~urisdiction 
by Washinqton. This would include not only uniJateraJ assertions 
~
such as the one at issue here, but also those made with the 
consent of the Indians involved. This would affect approximately 
20,000 Indians, of whom 8,000 have consented to jurisdiction and 
another 6,000 of whom are Yakimas. It would also affect those 
non-Indians living on land within reservations. Washinqton woul~ 
not be able to reassert jurisdiction over any of these Indians or 
their land, even with their consent, until its people had amended 
.. 
' J. 
Article XXVI of the state constitution. 
In other States, assertions of jurisdiction not preceded 
by the requisite constitutional amendment would also be ~ 
invalidated. According to the ~ bane majority opinion of the CA 
9, the other disclaimer States that have asserted ~urisdictjon 
over Indian lands are Arizona, Utah, North Dakota, and Montana. 
Goldberg, Public Law 280, supra, adds South Dakota to the list, 
but its assertion of jurisdiction has been invalidated by the 
South Dakota Supreme Court. Petition of Julia Hankins, 80 S.D. 
435, 125 N.W.2d 829. Arizona does not appear to have amended the 
disclaimer clause of its constitution, Article XX, para. 4, so 
the validity of its limited assertion of jurisdiction over air 
and water pollution control would be placed in question. Utah 
has not amended the diclaimer in Art. III of its constitution. 
Montana readopted its disclaimer as Art. I of its 1972 
constitution and has not alteren it, so its assertion of criminal 
jurisdiction over the Flathead Reservation would be invalidated. 
North Dakota has amended its disclaimer, Art. XVI, §203, as 
required by P.L. 280. 
II. The Partial Jurisdiction Issue 
A. The Question: Washington assumed criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country within the State in 
1963, but provided that the jurisdiction would not extend to 
Indians on their tribal lands or allotted lands held in trust, 
unless the Indian tribe consented to full jurisdiction or a 
matter arose within one of eight narrowly defined cateqories of 
jurisdiction. The question is whether P.L. 280, as it stood in 
1963, allowed the assertion of this kind of partial State 
jurisdiction. 
B. Discussion: The result of the assumption of 
jurisdiction by Washington is aptly described as a ~urisdictional 
"crazy quilt," with jurisdiction depending upon the place the 
case arises, the race of the plaintiff or the defendant or both, 
and the subject matter of the case. The inconveniences of such a 
jurisdictional system are obvious, and I wil1 not rehearse them 
here. 
There is no specific legislative history that sheds any 
~ on this problem of part]al jurisdiction. Goldberg, Public 
Law 280, supra, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 555. As a result, we are 
consigned to the language, structure, and qeneral purpose of the 
statute for evidence of the acceptability of Washinqton's 
jurisdictional scheme. 
The Indians and the SG start with the premise that ~6 
and §7 of P.L. 280 allow assertions of jurisdiction by Washinqton 
only if the terms of the jurisdictional assumption are consistent 
with §2 and §4 of the statute. Sections 2 and 4 are the sections 
conferring jurisdiction over Indian country on five States (known 
as the "mandatory States"). The Indians arque that since §2 and 
§4 conferred complete civil and criminal jurisdiction on the five 
mandatory States, the "option states" (States such as Washinqton 
which may but need not assume jurisdiction over Indians and 
Indian land) must make an equally complete assumption of 
jurisdiction. The SG, in a more moderate stance, notes that in 
some cases entire named reservations were excluded from State -------jurisdiction in the mandatory States, and concludes that similar 
~-----.......... -
geographic exclusions by the option states would be consistent 
with P.L. 280. The SG also concedes that assertion of either 
complete civil or complete criminal jurisdiction would be 
consistent with the statute, though no such partial subject 
matter jurisdiction was approved by §2 and ~4. 
Both the Indians and the SG agree that the assertion of 
jurisdiction at issue in the present case is c.911tr.§.l"y to the A#:#·~ 
purposes of P.L. 280. "The primary concern of Congress in 
'----------~--------
enacting Pub. L. 280 that emerges from its sparse legislative 
history was with the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian 
reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for 
law enforcement." Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 
(1976). A secondary purpose of the law was promotion of the 
assimilation of Indians into the qeneral population. Both of 
these purposes are better served, the Yakimas and the SG arque, 
by a construction of P.L. 280 requiring a more complete 
assumption of jurisdiction than the one made by Washington. The 
dissent from the CA 9's en bane consideration of the present case 
adopted this argument from the purposes of the statute as the 
basis for its conclusion that Washington's assertion of partial 
jurisdiction did not comply with P.L. 280. 
The State argues that the disclaimer in its enablinq act 
and State constitution only eschews jurisdiction over lands 
"owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes," and that lands 
within reservations but held in fee by non-Indians are not 
included within the scope of the disclaimer. The State concJudes 
that its assertion of jurisdiction over such lands is not 
controlled by Art. XXVI of its constitution or by P.L. 280. So 
far as I can tell, this is a novel and unacceptable construction 
of the scope of the disclaimer and the enabling act. It seems 
more reasonable and more in line with long-accepted practice to 
conclude, as the SG does, that the disclaimer applies to all 
"Indian country" as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. ~1151, 
including all land within the limits of a reservation. 
Section 7 of P.L. 280 authorizes the State to assume 
jurisdiction "in such manner as the people of the State shall ••• 
obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof." Accordinq to 
the State, "in such manner" allows the State to make a partial 
territorial assertion of jurisdiction within the Yakima 
reservation. It also, in the view of the State, allows the State 
to assert partial subject matter jurisdiction and leave to the 
Yakimas the choice as to whether the jurisdiction should be 
expanded to full jurisdiction. This idea of leaving a choice to 
the Indians by adopting the partial jurisdiction scheme underlies 
the State's strongest argument on the partial jurisdiction 
question. 
In Quinault Tribe v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 
1966), theCA 9 held that the assertion of jurisdiction by 
Washington was total, rather than partial, because the Indians 
could petition the State at any time to assume full jurisdiction 
over all Indian country. While it is true that in a sense this 
jurisdictional plan leaves the Indians with what they regard as a 
Hobson's choice, since the alternative of no state jurisdiction 
is excluded, it is also true that this exclusion was consistent 
with P.L. 280's authorization of unilateral assertions of 
jurisdiction between 1953 and 1968. Leaving this (limited) 
choice to the Yakimas does not detract from achievement of the 
primary goal of P.L. 280, the restoration of effective law 
enforcement on the reservations. The State stands ready to 
assume full jurisdiction at any time, should the Indians decide 
that they would prefer full jurisdiction. I think there is 
considerable force in the argument that for the purposes of P.L. 
280 the assertion of jurisdiction by Washington is effectively 
full jurisdiction, even though at the same time it preserves the 
opportunity for some degree of sovereignty for the Yakimas if 
they wish it. 
The State also argues that the assertion of jurisdjction 
by Washington was ratified in the passage of the 1968 amendments 
to P.L. 280. The 1968 amendments authorized assumptions of 
partial subject matter jurisdiction, though only with the consent 
of the Indians affected. The repeal of §7 of P.L. 280 provided 
that the repeal had no effect on any assertion of jurisdiction 
made pursuant to §7 before its repeal. ~he State reqards this 
saving clause as a ratification of Washington's jurisdictional 
scheme. But the SG argues, with good reasons, that the saving 
clause merely leaves the validity of the earlier assumptions of 
jurisdiction by the States unaffected by the 1968 law, and does 
not settle the question of the validity of state assumptions of 
jurisdiction under earlier law. 
C. Consequences of a Decision for the Yakimas on the 
Partial Jurisdiction Issue: A holding for the Yakimas on the 
limited partial jurisdiction ground suggested by the SG would 
affect about 10,000 Indians in Washington, according to the 
dissent in the CA 9 en bane decision. Of those, about two-thirds 
are parties in interest in this lawsuit. 
Other States with either partial geographic jurisdiction 
or partial subject matter jurisdiction inconsistent with the 
principles suggested by the SG (that is, States with jurisdiction 
over less than entire reservations, or over less than all civil 
or all criminal cases) are Arizona, Iowa, Idaho, and North 
Dakota. Montana exercises criminal jurisdiction over an entire 
reservation. Arizona and Washington, as well as Montana, are 
already on the list of disclaimer states that have asserted 
jurisdiction without amending their state constitutions. Arizona 
has assumed jurisdiction over Indian lands only with reqard to 
air and water pollution control. 
III. The Equal Protection Issue 
I must confess at the outset that I have difficulty 
getting a firm grasp on just what it is about the Washinqton 
jurisdictional scheme that Judge Hufstedler and her CA 9 panel 
found to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The 
objectionable feature appears to have been the assertion of 
criminal law jurisdiction over land held in fee within the 
reservation without a matching assertion of jurisdiction over non-
fee or trust land. The panel termed this "the classification 
based on the status of title to the land upon which an alleqed 
criminal offense occurs." In the view of theCA 9 panel, this 
assertion of jurisdiction defined by the title to the land on 
which the crime occurs results in a situation in which an Indian 
living on a parcel of non-fee land who is the victim of a crime 
has no law enforcement protection from the State, while an Indian 
living on fee land does enjoy such protection. What the panel 
was getting at, I think, is that the jurisdictional scheme 
classifies people according to whether they live on Indian or non-
Indian land. 
~ 
The CA 9 panel concluded that the tit1e-based system o
criminal jurisdiction was not based on racial classifjcations, 
since both Indians and non-Indians live on both fee and non-fee 
lands. Nor could the CA 9 find any basis for thinkinq that the 
classification actually adopted was only a mask for invidious 
racial discrimination. The CA 9 applied the rational basis test, 
and concluded that Washington's assumption of iurisdiuction --------failed to meet that standard. ---__.::::-"--- -------
I cannot see, however, that the classification in 
question has resulted in any denial of equal protection. The 
State does not leave Indians on non-fee lands without criminal 
law protection. Whatever jurisdiction the State does not assume 
is retained by the federal government and the tribal council, so 
there is no hiatus. Further, the Indians can have the benefjt of 
full State jurisdiction for the asking. It is also worth noting 
that under current law the State is authorized to make an 
assumption of partial subject matter jurisdiction, albeit only 
with the consent of the Indians affected. 
The State also suggests what to my mind is a satisfying 
rationale for the title-based classification embodied in the 
assumption of jurisdiction. The State unilaterally asserted full -- ------------------------jurisdiction over all land held in fee within the reservation, 
but only partial subject matter jurisdiction over non-fee and 
trust lands. The State suggests that this classification served 
~
the purpose of allowing the Indians to preserve a larqe measure 
of autonomy and self-government on Indian lands. The Indians 
were given a choice between retaining limited autonomy, or of 
acceding to full state jurisdiction. The State has a legitimate 
interest in allowing the Indians within its borders to preserve 
some measure of tribal autonomy, even while the State is movinq 
to provide effective law enforcement within the reservation. ~he 
classification adopted is related reasonably to that purpose. 
. ) 
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Confederated Bands and Tribes 
of the Yakima Indian Nation. 
On Appeal from the United 
States Court of Appeal$ 
for the Ninth Circuit .. 
{Ja,nuary -, 1979] 
~ 
k~~ 
MR. JusTICE STEWAR'.r delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case we are called upon to resolve a dispute between ~~u­
the State of Washington and the Yakima Indian Nation over 
the validity of the State's exercise of jurisdiction on the ~  
Yakima Reservation. In 1963 the Washington Legislature ~ A.JA ~~"~ •• .J 
obligated the Sta.te to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction ·-.r~ 
over Indians and Indian territory within the State, subject '-""....,..-z:;....u.t~.u.~Hi:...-.'-tl!~'­
only to the condition that in all but eight subject-matter~ ~ 
areas jurisdiction would not extend to Indians on trust or- I ~ 
restricted lands without the request of the Indian tribe af-.J .J. ~ 
fected. Ch. 36, 1963 Washington Laws.1 The Yakima Nation~ 
 1 The statute, codified as R. C. W. S. 37.12.010, provides: ~'Assumption of criminal and civil juris(liction by state 
"Assumption of criminal and civil jurisdiction by sta.te. The State of 
Washington hereby obligates and bind:s itself to a<i<>'ume criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and 
lands within this state in accordance with the con;;ent of the United States 
given by the act of August 15, 1953 (Public La.w 280, 83rd Congrffi.S, 1st 
Session), but such as;;umption of jurisdiction shall not app!y to Indians 
when on their tribal lands or allotted lands within an e-stablished Indian 
reservation and held in trust by the United States or subject to a restric-
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did not make such a request. State authority over Indians 
within the Yakima Reservation was thus made by Chapter 36 
to depend on the title status of the property on which the 
offense or transaction occurred and upon the nature of the 
subject-matter. 
'The Yakima Nation brought this action in a federal district 
court challenging the statutory and constitutional validity of 
the State's partial assertion of jurisdiction on its Reservation. 
The Tribe contended that the federal statute upon which the 
State based its authority to assume jurisdiction _ over the 
Re&'rvation, Public Law 83-280/ imposed certain procedural 
requirements, with which the State had not complied,-most 
notably, a requirement that Washington first amend its own 
constitution-and that in any event Pub. L. 280 did not 
authorize the State to assert only pa.rtial jurisdiction within 
an Indian Reservation. Finally, the Tribe contended that 
Chapter 36. even if authorized by Congress, violated the Equal 
Protection and .. Due Process guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The District Court rejected both the statutory and consti-
of R. C. W. 37.12.021 (tribal con~:~eut) have been invoked, except for the· · 
following: 
"(1) Compulsory school attendance; 
"(2) Public as~:~istance; 
" (3) Domestic relations; 
" ( 4) Mrntn] Illness; 
" ( 5) ,Juvenile delinquency; 
" ( 6) Adoption proceedings; 
" (7) Dependent children; and 
"(8) Operation of mott>r vehicles upon the public streets, alleys, roads· 
and highways; Provided further, That Indian tribt>S that petitioned for, 
were granted and brcame subject to state juri:;diction purl:luant to this · 
chapter on or before March 13, 1963 shall remain subject tg state civil and 
criminal jurisdiction as if chapter 36, Laws of 1963 had not been enacted."' 
The statute will be referred to in this opinion Hl:i Chapter 36. 
2 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-590.. For the fuU t~t of 
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tutional claims and entered judgment for the State.3 On 
appeal, the contention that Washington's assumption of only 
partial jurisdiction was not authorized by Congress was re-
jected by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting 
en bane. The en bane court then referred the case to the 
original panel for consideration of the remaining issues. Cort;-
federated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima. Indian 1\·ation of 
Washington, 550 F. 2d 443 (Yakirn:a 1).4 The three-judge 
panel, confining itself to consideration of the constitutional 
validity of Chapter 36, concluded that the "checkerboard" 
jurisdictional system it produced was without any rational 
3 The complaint. also eontained other ela.in1>1 that were decidf'd adver~ely 
to t,he plaintiff by the Di~trict Court. After extensive dit>e.overy and the 
entry of a pretrial order, the Dib1rict Court granted partial ;,;ummary 
judgment. in favor of thf' Shtte on seveml of thesf' claims. On the que~­
tion of compliance with Pub. L. 280, the District Court held tha.t it wa~ 
bound by the decision of thf' Court. of AppeaJs for the Ninth Circuit in 
Quinault v. Gallagher, 368 F. 2d 648, 655-658 (1966), which had deter-
mined that the State of Wa~hrngton could accept juriHdietion undt·r Pub. 
L. 280 without. firt)t amending its con:;t,itution and that Washington's 
jurhsdictional arrangement did not, constitute an authorized partial a~Ssump­
tion of juri~diction . The Di~t.rict Court also rejc;>cted thfl rlaim that 
Chapter 36 was facially invalid under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The question of the 
constitutional validity of Chapter 86 a:; appliro to the Yakima Re~ervation 
was reserved for a hearing and factual determination. After a. onl:'-week 
trial, the Di:st.rict. Court. found tlutt. tlw appellee had not proved "that the 
state or county ha.ve discriminated ... to deprive any Indian or the 
plaintiff Tribe of any service or protection, resource or aSIS('t. afforded 
under the same state law to other citi21ens or similar geographic location." 
The complaint .wu.s then dismissed . 
The opmion of the District Court is unreported. 
1 The en bane hearing was ordered by the Court of Appeal:,; sua sponte 
after the original panel had heard ar~~:ument . This hearing wa;; limited to 
the que,;tion whether that Court's earlier partia.l juri:sdiction holding in 
Quinault v. Gallagher, supra, n. 3, should be overruled. A majority of the 
en bane panel agreed with the result in Quinault, finding no statutory 
1mpediment to the assumpt.ion of partial geographic and subjert-mat.ter 
jurisdiction 550 F . 2d 443, 448. Four judges dissented. ld., at 441t 
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foundation and therefore violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finding no basis upon 
which to sever the offending portion of the legislation, the 
appellate court declared Chapter 36 unconstitutional in its 
entirety, and reversed the judgment of the District Court. 
'Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation 
of Washington, 552 F. 2d 1132 (Ya:kima II). 
The State then brought an appeal to this Court. In noting 
probable jurisdiction of the appeal, we requested the parties 
to address the issue whether the ~ pa.rtial geographic and 
subject-matter jurisdiction ordained by Chapter '36 is author-
'ized by federal la.w, as well as the Equal Protection Clause 
issue. 435 U. S. 903;5 
~The thre!'-judge appellate com·t's equal protection deci;;ion was based 
upon the diJ::parity cr.ea.ted by Chapier 36 in ma.king criminal juri!:idiction 
over Indian,; dPpend upon whet.hPr thP a.Ueged offerLSe occurred on fee or 
nonfee land. 5.52 F. 2d 1;~32, 1334-1335. The court found this criterion 
for the ext>rcise of stMe cr.iminal ]urisdiction facially uncon;;titutional. 
The appellate court found it unnPrt>S:><u~·, tht>refore, to reach t.he Tribe's 
content.ion that the eight. ~tatu1or~r cntegorie~ of sltbjt>c1-matter juri~Sdiction 
are vague or its furtht•r cont(>ntion that the application of Chapter 36 
deprived it of equal protection of the la.w;;. 550 F. 2d, at 1884. 
In its Motion to Affirm, filed here in response to t.he appellants' jurisdic-
tional Statement, the Yakima Nation invo~ed in !:iUpport of the judgment. 
"each and every one" of the eontentions it had made in the District Court 
and Court of Appeals, "bttt. limitt>"d its di~cttssicm to the equa.J protection 
rationale relied upon by the appellate court. In its brief on the merits 
the Tribe has addressed-in addition to those subjects implicit in ol)r 
order not.ing probable jurisdiction, see n. 20, infra, one issue tha.t merits 
brief discus.->ion. The Tribe contends that Chapter 86 is void for failure 
to meet the standards of definitenel:iS required by the Due Process Clause 
' of the Fourteenth Amendment, m;serting tha.t the eight subject-matter 
categories over which the State has extended full jurisdiction are too vague 
t o give tribal members adequate notice of wha.t conduct is punishable 
under ~tate law. This challenge i;; without merit. As the District. Court 
uhserved, Chapter 86 creates no new criminal offenses but merely extends 
jurisdiction over certain classes of offen;;es defined elsewhere il1 sta.te law. 
If thofi(J offenses are not, sufficiently defined, individual tribal members may 
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I 
The Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian 
Nation comprise 14 originally distinct Indian tribes that 
joined together in the middle of the 19th century for purposes 
of their relationships with the United States. A treaty was 
signed with the United States in 1855, under which it was 
agreed that the various tribes would be considered "one na-
tion" and that specified lands located in the Territory of 
Washsington would be set aside for their exclusive us~. The 
treaty was ratified by Congress in 1859. 12 Stat. 951. Since 
that time, the Yakima Nation has without interruption maiu-
tained its tribal identity. 
The Yakima .Reservation is located in the southeastern part 
of the State of Washington and now consists of approximately 
1,387,505 acres of land, of which some 80% is held in trust by 
the United States for the Yakima Nation or individual mem-
bers of the Tribe. The remaining parcels of land are held in 
fee by Indian and non-Indian owners. Much of the trust 
acreage on the .Reservation is forest. The Tribe receives the 
bulk of its income from timber, and over half Of the .Reserva-
tion is closed to permanent settlement in order to protect the 
forest area. The remaining lands a.re primarily agricultural 
There are three incorporated towns on the Reservation, the 
largest being Toppenish, with a population of under 6,000. 
The land held in fee is scattered throughout the. Reserva-
tion, but most of it is concentrated in the northeastern portion 
close to the Yakima River and within the three towns of 
Toppenish, Wapato, and Harrah. Of the 25,000 permanent 
residents of the Reservation, 3,074 are members of the Yakima 
are hrought. See Younger v. HmTis, 401 U. S. 37. The eight subject-
matter areas are themtselves defined with reasonable clarity in langua.ge no 
lesl'l JH't'eise than that commonly aeeeptcd in federal jurisdictional sta.tutes 
in t.he same field. Set> United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544. The 
D1strict Court's ruling that Cha.pter 36 i:s not void for vagut>nr,.;::; under the 






6 WASHINGTON v. YAKIMA INDIAN NATION 
Nation. and tribal members live in all of the inhabited a.reas 
of the Reservation.6 In the three towns-where over half of 
the non-Indian population resides-members of the Tribe are 
substantially outnumbered by non-Indian residents occupying 
fee land. 
Before the enactment of the state law here in issue, the 
Yakima Nation was subject to the general jurisdictional prin-
ciples that apply in Indian country in the absence of federal 
legislation to the contrary. Under those principles, which 
received their first and fullest expression in Worcester v. 
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 517, state law reaches within the exterior 
boundaries of an Indian reservation only if it would not 
infringe "on the right of reservation Indians to make their 
own laws and be ruled by them." Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 
217, 219-220.7 As a practical matter, this has meant that 
criminal offenses by or aga.inst Indians have been subject only 
to federal or tribal laws, Moe v. Salish & Kooten£Li Tribes, 425 
U. S. 463 (1976), except where Congress in the exercise of its 
plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs ha.s "expressly 
provided that State laws shall apply." McClan£than v. Ari-
zona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. ~. 164, 170--171. 
Pub. L. 280, upon which the State of Washington relied for 
its authority to assert jurisdictiou over the Yakima Reserva-
tion under Chapter 36, was enacted by Congress in 1953 in 
part to deal with the "problem of lawlessness on certain 
Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal insti-
6 The::::e are Lhe member~hip figtll'eH given by the District Court. The 
United States, in its amicus curiae brief, has indicated that more than 
t> ,OOO tribal members live permanently on the Heservation and that the 
number incrPU;;('S during the ;summer month~-; . 
1 The:;e abstmct principles do not and could not adequately describe the 
compkx jurisdictional rules that luwe developed over the years in cases 
mvolvmg jnrisclictional classes between the State:; and tribal In,dians ~ince 
Worre11ter v. Gl!orgia was decided. For a full tre;ttment of the subject, see 
gPnerally M. Price, Law and the Ame.ric:m Indian (1973); U. S. Dept. 
lpt., Federal I11dia:u Lu w (1958) , 
17-388---0PINION 
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tutions for law enforcement." Bryan v. lta.sca County, 473. 
U. S. 373, 379; H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 
(1953) . The basic terms of Pub. L. 280, which was the first 
federal jurisdictional statute of general applicability to Indian 
Reservation lands,8 are well known.9 To five States it effected 
an immediate cession of criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
Indian country, with an express exception for the reservations 
8 See M. Price, sup·ra, n. 7, at 210. Before 1958, there had been other 
surrenders of authority to some States. See, e. g., 62 Stat. 1224, 26 
U. S. C. § 232 (New York), 64 Stat. 845, 25 U. S. C. § 233 (New York 
1950); Act. of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat.. 249 (Ka.nsa.;;); Act of 
May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229 (North Dakota); and Act of June 30, 
1948, rh. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (Iowa). Pub. L. 280, however, wa~; the first 
federal statute to attempt au omnibus transfer. 
9 The Act provides in full : 
"AN ACT To ronfer jurisdiction on the States of California., Minnesota., 
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconb1n, with reo;pect to criminal offenses and 
civil cau~es of action committ-ed or arising on Indian reservations within 
such States, and for other purposes 
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives . of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That chapter 53 of title 
18, United States Code, is hereby amended by inserting at the end of the 
chapter analysis preceding section 1151 of such title the following new 
item: 
"'1162. State jurisdiction over offenses committed by or a.gaim;t Indian~ 
in the Indian rountry.' 
"SBC. 2. Title 18, United States Code, is hereby amended by inserting 
in cha.pter 53 thereof immediately a,fter section 1161 a new section, to he 
designated a~ section 1162, as follows: 
"§ llti2. State juri~diction over offenses committed by or against Indians· 
in the Indian country 
" (a) Each of t.he State~ listed in the following table shall have Jurisdic-
tion over offenses committed by or ngainst Indians in the a.rooo; of Indian 
country li,;ted opposite the name of the State to the ~ame extent that such 
State has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State, 
and the criminal law~ of ::;uch State shall have the same force and effect 




, ,, .. 
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of three tribes. Pub. L. 280, §§ 2 and 4.10 To the remaining 
States it gave an option to assume jurisdiction over criminal 
offenses and civil causes of action in Indian country without 
"State of Indian count.ry affect('(l 
California All Indian country within the State 
Minne~oht. All Indian country within the State, pxcept the Red Lake 
Reservation 
Nebraska All Indian country within the Stat.e 
Oregon AU Indian rountry within the State, except the Warm Springs 
Re.'ltlrva,tion 
Wiscon~in All Indian country within the State, except the Menominee 
ReservtLtion 
"(b) Nothjng in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, 
or taxation of any rettl or pE'rsonal Jlroperty, including wa.ter rights, 
belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is 
held in tru:>t by the United Stutes or is :c;ubject to a restriction ag.aiJH!!t 
alienation imposed by the United State:>; or shall authorize regulation of 
the use of such property in a manner incon~Sistent with any Federal treaty, 
agreement, or statute or with any r<>gulation :qwde pursuant thereto; or 
f<hall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any 
right., privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or 
sta,tute with respect. to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, 
licensing, or regulation thereof. 
" (c) The provisions of sections 115'2 and 1153 of thi~ chapter shall not 
be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of 
this S<>ct ion." 
"SEC. 3. ChaptPr 85 of titl£' 23, United States Code, is hereby amended 
by mserting at the end of the chapter analysis preceding section 1331 of 
such title the following new item: 
'' '1:360. State civil jurisdiction in actions to which Indians are parties! 
"SEC. 4. Title 28, United States Code, is herpby amendPd by inserting· 
in chapter 85 thereof immediately after sect.ion 1359 a new section, to be 
designated as f<ection 1360, as follows: 
;'§ 1360. Stat.e civil jurisdiction in actions to which Indians are parties 
"(a) Each of the State:-; listed in the following table shall have jurisdic-
tion over civil causes of act.ion between Indians or to which Indians are 
-parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed opposit£' the name 
Qf the State to the same extent tlmt such Sutte has jurii:idiction over othef' 
[Footnote 10 is o'l!' p. 10] 
.. 
77 -388-0PINION 
WASHINGTON v. YAKIMA INDIAN NATION \l 
consulting with or securing the consent of the tribes that 
would be affected. States whose constitutions or statutes 
'Contained organic law disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indiat\ 
civil ca.uses of action, and thm;e civil laws of such State that are of general 
application to private persons or private property shall have the same 
force and effect within ~;uch Indian cow1try as they have elsewhere within 






Indian country affected 
All Indian country within the Statt' 
All Indian eountry within the State, except the Red La.k~ 
Reservation 
All Indian country within the State 
All Indian country within the State, except the Wa.rm Spring! 
Reservation 
Wisconsin All Indian country within the State, except the Menominee 
Reservation 
" ' (b) Nothing in this section shaJI authorize the alienation, eneum· 
brance, or ta.xa.tjon of a.ny real of personal property, including water 
rights, belonging to any Indian or a.ny Indian tribe, band, or community 
t.hat i11 held in trust by the LJnited States or is subject to 11 re::;triction 
ag:~inst alienat.ion imposed by the United Sta.tes; or shall authorize regula-
tion of the use of such property in a. manner inconsistent with any Federal 
treaty, agrPement, or statute or with a.ny regulation made pursuant 
thereto ; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in 
proba.te proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession oi 
such property or any int~rest therein. 
"' (c) Any tribal ordinanre or cu:,:tom heretofOI'e or hereafter adopted 
by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority 
which it, may po~:seS~> shall, if not incon~istent. with uny applicnble civil 
law of the State, be given full force and effect in the determinat-ion of 
civil ca.uses of action pursuant to this section.' 
"SEC. 5. Section 1 of the Act of October 5, 1949 (63 Stat . 705, ch. 
604), is hereby repealed, but such repeal shall not affect any proceedings 
beretoforu instituted under that section. 
'"SEC. 6. Notwithstanding tlw provi~;ions of a.ny Enabling Act for the 
admission of a Sta.t,e, the consent of the United States is hereby given to 
the people of ;my Sta.te (() amend, where necessary, their Sta.te con::;titution 
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country were dealt with in § 6.11 The people of those States 
were given permission to arnen(l; "where necessary" their state 
constitution or existing statutes to remove any legal impedi-
ment to the assl.j.ri.1ption of Jurisdiction. under the Act. Pub. 
L. 280, § 6. All others were covered in § 7.12 
The Washington Constitution coutains a disclaimer of au-
thority over Indian country,~ a aJ1d the State is, therefore, one 
of those covered by § 6 of Pub. L. 280. · The State did not 
take any action under the purported authority of Pub. L. 280 
until 1957. ln that year its legislature enacted a statute 
which obligated the State to assume criminal and civi·J juris~ 
diction over any Indian reservation within the State at the 
request of the tribe affected.14 Under this legislation state 
jurisdiction was requested by and exte11ded to several Iudi~1 
tribes within the State.15 
to the rtssumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with tl1e 
provisions of thi;; Act.: Provided,· That the provisions of this Art shall not 
become ,effective with re,spect to such assumption of juri~diction by nny 
such State until the people tl1ereof have upproprin,t,ely amended their 
State const.itution or ,;tatnte~ as the case may be. 
"SEC. 7. The con,;ent of the United Statr~:~ il'l hrreby givNI to any 
other State not having juri~diction with respect to criminal offen&-s .or 
civil c<Luses of actjon, or with respect to both, as provided for in t.hi:s Act, 
to a&;ume jmisdiction at such time aild in such manner us the people of 
the Sbte :>hall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the 
Stn.t10 t,o a:ssumption thereof." 
10 See n . 9, supra. The five Stat.es· given immrcli~te jurisdiction were 
California., Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wi:sconsin . Alaska was 
added to this group in 1958. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 
72 Stat. 545 (1958), codified at 18 U.S. C. § 1162 (1976), 28 U.S. C.§ 1360 
(1976). 
11 See n. 9, supra. 
J~ S(>e n. 9, supm. 
n Wa~h. C'..onst., Art. XXVI, ,f 2. 
H lL C. W. ch. 07.12. 
1 '' For a detailed discussion of the Washington history under Pub. L. 280, 
see 1 National American Indian Court, Judges Ass'n: The 1m pact · of 
Public La,w 280 upon the Administration of Criminal .lu:stice on Indian 
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In one of the first prosecutions brought under the 1957 
jurisdictional scheme, an Indian defendant whose tribe had 
consented to the extension of jurisdiction challenged its valid-
ity on the ground that the disclaimer clause in the state 
constitution had not been amended in the mauner allegedly 
required by § 6 of Pub. L. 280. State v. Paul, 53 W. 2d 789 
(1959). The Washington Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment, construing the state constitutional provision to mean 
that the barrier posed by the disclaimer could be lifted by the 
state legis1ature. '0 
In 1963, Washington enacted Chapter 36, the law at issue 
in this 1itigation.l7 The most significant featqre of the new 
statute was its provision for the extension of at least some 
jurisdiction over all Indian lands within the Sta.te, whether or 
not the affected tribe gave its consent. Full criminal and 
civil jurisdiction to the extent permitted by Pub. L. 280 was 
extended to all fee lands in every Indian reservation and to 
trust and allotted lands therein when non-Indians were in-
volved. Except for eight categories of law, however, state 
.iurisdiction was not extended to Indians on allotted and trust 
lands unless the affected tribe so requested. The eight juris-
dictional categories of state law that were thus extended to all 
parts of every Indian reservatioll were in the areas of compul~ 
sory school attendance, public assistance, domestic relations, 
men tal illness, juvenile delinquency, adoption proceedings, 
dependent children, and motor vehicies.18 
10 The Wwshington Supreme C-ourt relied upon a previou:; dl.'cision in 
which it had rejected a challenge to Washington legislation permitting 
tn,xat10n of property leased from the FPderal Government. Boeing Air-
craft v. Recon.structwn Pinance Corp•., 25 W. 2d 652 (1982). The Boeing' 
11-'~l~lation was challengl.'d on th£~ ground t.hat the State had faill'd to 
l'!.'lllUvtl by amendmf•nt a constitutional disclaimer of authority to tax 
fedl.'rul property, and the Wa:shington Court held in Boeing that IPgJsla.tive.: 
a.ct.ion was IStlfficient. 
11 See n. 1, supra. 
1s See n . 1 aJld n . 5, supra~ 
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The Yakima Indian Nation did not request the full measure 
of jurisdiction made possible by Cha.pter 36, and the Yakima 
Reservation thus became subject to the system of jurisdic-
tion outlined at the outset of this opinion.19 This litigation 
followed. 
II 
The Yakima Nation relies on three separate and independ-
ent grounds in asserting that Chapter 36 is invalid. First, it 
argues that under the terms of Pub. L. 280 Washington was 
not authorized to enact Chapter 36 until the state constitution 
had been amended by "the people" so as to eliminate its Art. 
XXVI which disclaimed state authority over Indian lands.>!o 
19 Tho:se tribf'S that had con:sentPd to :slate juri::;dict.ion under the 1957' 
law remainrd fully subject to ~<uch juriwiction. R. C. W. :~7112.010 
(1976). Since 1963 only one tribr, the Colville, hn.s requested the P.xten~ 
siqn of full state jurisdiction. 1 Indian Court Judgrs, supra, n. 15, at 
77-81. The Yakima Nation, P.VE>r ::;inre 1952 when its repre:sentativPs 
objt>dP.d before a congre:s.sional eommittff' to a predect>ssor of Pub. L. 280, 
see n. 33, infra, has con::>i~:;tmtly contested· the wisdom and the legality of 
at.t.empt:; by the State to exercii>e juri::;diction over it~; Re:servation la,nds. 
See ibid. 
>!0 Wal'<hington ~;trenuously argues that. t.his que:stion is not properly 
before tht1 Court. We think that it 1~. The Yakima Indian Nation has 
pressed thi:s issue throughout tfle litigation. Tn it~; motion to Dismi"-; o-r 
Affirm, the alleg:ed invalidity of Wa,.;hington's legi:slative a.s:sumption of 
jurisdiction was presented as a basis upon which the judgment below 
should be sustained. See n. 5, supra. As the prt>v<tiling party, the appel· 
loe was of course free to dP.fmd it.-: judgment on nn); ground properly 
rai;;ed below whether or not that ground was relif'd upon, rejectP.d, or even 
con:sidered by the District Court. or the Court of Appeals. United States 
v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435-436; Dandri-dge v. WilliarM, 
397 lT. S. 471, 475, and n. 6. Moreover, the disclaimer issue was implicit 
in the snbJects the parties were reque:>ted to address in our order noting 
prohnble jurisdiction of this appeal. 435 U. S. 903. Cf. Gent v. Arkansas, 
384 1'. S. 937; Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Cornrnission, 401 U.S. 931. 
Washington alw contend;; that this Court's summary disnus.-;als in 
Makah Indian Tribe v. Washington, 76 Wash. 2d 485, 457 P. 2d 4gp 
(1969), appeal dismi;;::;ed, 397 U. S. 316; Tonasket v. Washington, 84 
Wash. 2d 164, 525 P . 2d 744 {1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U. S. 915; a.nd, 
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Secolld, it contends that Pub. ~· 280 does not authorize a 
State to extend only partial jurisdiction over an Indian reser-
vation. Finally, it asserts that Chai)ter 36, even if authorized 
by Pub. L. 280, violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution. We turn now to consideration of each of these 
arguments, 
Comeno·ut v. Burdrnan, 84 Wash. 2d 192, appeal di~mi~sed, 420 U. S. 915, 
should preclude reconsideration of the disclaim~r it-!ISue here. In t.host? 
cases, it had beeu argued that Wa~hington's statutory assumption of 
juri;;diction wa.~ ineffective under Pub. L. 280 and invalid under the state 
constitution bec:tu:oe of the ab:oence of a const.itutiona,J amendment elimi-
nating Chapter XXVI. In each cas~, the Washington Supreme Court 
rejected both t.he state constitutional and the federal argtunent:>. On 
appeal from each, the appellants que;:;tioned the validity of the ~ta.te 
court's eonclu~ion that under the federal ~tu.tute no constitutional tunend-
ment was required. Our summary dismissal are, of course, to be taken 
as rulings on the merits, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 343-845, in the 
sense tha.t they r('jected the "specific challenges pr!:'~ented in the statements 
of juri:odiction" and left "t\i1disturbed the judgment appealed f;rom.'1 
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U. S. 173, 1'76. They do not, however, have the 
same nrecedential value here as does an opinion of this Court after briefing 
and oral argument on the mt>rits, Edelmwi v. Jordan. 415 U. S. 651, 
670-671; Richardson v. Rainirez. 418 U. S. 24, 58. A smnmary dismissal 
of an appeal represents no more than a view that the judgment appealed 
from W&:l eorrect. as to those federal quPstions rajsed and necessary to the 
decision. It does not, as we ha.ve continued to stre:;s, see, e. g., Mandel v. 
Bradley, supra, nece>~sarily reflect our agreement with the opinion of the 
Court whose judgmPnt, is appealed. It is not at all unusual for the 
Comi. f'o find it. appropriate to give full consideration to a que,.,;tion that 
has been the ::;ubject of previous summary action. Massachu:.setts Bd. of 
Retirement v. M·urgia, 427 U. S. 307, 309 n. 1; Usery v. T·urner Elkhom 
Mining Co ., 42R U. S. 1, 14. We do so in this case. The question that 
W&:~hington asks us to avoid or to resolve· on the basis of stare decisis ha<~ 
ne\'ler received full plenary attention here. It. has been the subject of 
exten~Jve briefing and argument by the part.ie::;. It has prov~ked several, 
somewhat uncertain, opinions from the Washington courts, seen. 26, infra, 
whose ultimate judgments were the subjects of summary di::;missa.ls here. 
Fmally, it is an issue upon which the Executive Branch of the 1.Tnited 
Stkttes Government. hM recently dm.nged its position diamet.rie<tlly as; 
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III 
\Ve first address the contention that Washington was re-
quired to amend its constitution before it could validly 
legislate under the authority of Pub. L. ·280. If the Tribe is 
correct, we need not co11sider· the statutor·y and constitutional 
questions raised by the system of partial jurisdiction estab-
lished in Chapter 36. The Tribe. supported by the United 
States as amicus curiae,~~ argues that a requirement for pop-
ular amendatory action is to he found in the express terms of 
~ 6 of Pub. L. 280 or. if not there, in the terms of the 
Enabling Act that admitted \Yashington to the rnion. 22 The 
argument can best bt- understood in the context of the specific 
statutory provisions involved. 
A 
The Enabling Act under which Wa.Shington, along with the 
~~The United Stat<>R lw .. « full~· briefed the ronstitutionaJ arntwlment 
question and the qu<·~tion w1wtlwr parti,d 'jmi:-<diet.ion i;.; authorized by 
Pub. L. 280. Its position on tlw rqual protertion holding of the Court of 
Appeal:; j,.: Pquivoeal. 
22 The Tribe abo rontl'nds that under its 1855 Trt>at~· with the United 
Stitu•,.;, 12 Stat. 951, it was guurantr>rd a right. of :;~.•lf-gowrnmt>llt that wax 
not cxpre~sly abrogated b~· Pub. ·L. 280. The argument assume~ that· 
·under our ea~>', sr<•, e. g., Mmuminee T1·ibe v. United State3, ;{~)1 U. S. 
404, trt>at~· right~ are pre,;erved unlr;-;~ Congres.s has shown a ~[)t'Cific intent 
to abrognte them. Although we have ,.;tated that the intention to abrogate 
or modify a treat~· i:> not to bo lightly imputed, Menominee 1'1ibe v. 
United States. supra, at 413; Pigl'on Rivn f'o. v. Cox ro .. 291 U. S. 138, 
160, thl~ rule of eonstruction mu~t bf' applied sen~·ibly. In thiH context, 
the argument made b~· the Tribe is tendentious. The treat~· right a~erted 
by tlw Tribe i~ jurisdietional. So al~o is t11e '1'ntire subjPet-mattt>r of 
'Pub. L. 21:!0. To neeept the Tribe';; po>'ition would br to hold that 
Congress could not pas:> ·~ juri~rlidional law of griwntl applicability to 
'lncliau ro1mtr~· unlr~,; in so domg it itt>mized all potentiall~· eonfiicting 
"trmty right:> that. it wished to affPrt. This we declinr to clo. Thr intent 
to a.hrogate incon,;iHtent trt>aty right" is elrar enough from the t-xpres~:> 
termH of Pub. L . 2M. The Tril)(•'s argumrni on this j)Qint warraJH8 no 
'further lli;;cusewn. 
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States of Mo11tana, North Dakota, South Dakota. and Mon-
tana gained entry into the Union, was passed in 1889. Act of 
Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180.2 '! Section 4 of that Act required the 
constitutional conventions of the prospective new States to 
23 Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, S. 4, 25 Stat. 676. The act pro ideH: 
"1. Enabling Act for the Admi:ssion of Wu~hington and Other States (25 
St<t t. 6,76), Section 4 
"Be it eru.u:tecl by the Senate and Home of Representatives vf the 
United States of America in Congri!S8 assembeld, That the inhabitantl:i of 
all that part of the a,rea of the Unit('d State;; now constituting the Terri-
tories of Dakota, Montana, and Washington, a:; at present det:erilwd, ma.y 
becomfl the Statet; of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and 
WUl:ihington, respectively, a:s hereinafter provided. 
"SBC. 4. That the delegates to the conventiOns elertt-d a;; prov1ded for 
in thi;; net. shall meet at the S('Ht of government of each of said Ter-
ritones ... a.fter organization, shall declare, on bt>half of the people of 
said proposed Stat~><>, that th<'y ndopt the Constitution of the United 
States ; whereupon the said convent.ions shall bt>, and are hereby, author-
ized to form constitutions ana StateH govermnf'nt;; for said proposed 
States, resJWrtivf'ly. Tf1e con~titutions shall be republiran in form, a.ncf 
makP no distinction in civil or political right.s on account. of r!Wc or color, 
exc!'pt a:; to Indium; not taxPd, and not bt> repugnant to thf' Constitution 
of th<~ United States and thf' principlPs of th<' Declaration of Independ-
encP. And smd convPntions shall providP, by ordinances irrevocable· 
wit.hout the consent of the Unitf'd States and the pPopfe of said Statps:· 
"Second. That the ptople inhnbitmg ;;aid proposed Statf's do agr<'t' and' 
declare that thPy forevPr di:;claim all right and titlf' to thf' unappropriated' 
public land,; lying within the boundarif'~ thPreof, and to all laud-, lying 
within ;;aid limits owned or held by u.ny Indian or Indian tribes; and that 
·until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the Unitf'd Sta.tes, 
the samP sha.ll be and remain subject to the disposition of the l lnited 
Statf'~, <Uld said Indian lands :shall rpmain under the absolutf' jurisdiction 
uud <"ont rol of the Congress of the l:rnitrd Sta.tP~ : ... " 
Uther admitting Act;; reqUiring a disclaimer of authority ovf't' Indian 
lands are Mt of .July 16, 1894, eh. 138, 28 Stat. 107 (Utah); Ac-t of 
June Hi, 1906, eh. 3335, 34 Stat. 2fii (Oklahoma); Act of June 20, 1910, 
ch. 310, :36 Stat. 557 (Arizona and Kew :\IPxico) . The language of these 
A.cts is vu'tually the ;;ame as than of 25 Stat. 671\i.. 
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enact provisions by which the people disclaimed title to lands 
owued by Indians or Indian tribes and acknowledged that 
those lands were to remain "under the absolute jurisdiction 
and control of" Congress until the Indian or United States 
title had been extinguished. Id., ch. 180. The disclaimers 
were to be made "by ordinances irrevocable without the con-
sent of the United States and the people of the States." 
Ibid. Washington's constitutional convention ena.cted the 
disclai~ner of authority over Indian lands as part of Art. 
XXVI ' of the state constitution.24 That Article, captioned 
"Compact with the United States," is prefaced with the 
statement-precisely tracking the language of the admitting 
24 Wa:;h. Con:;t. Art. XXVI, n. 2. Art. XXVI reads as follows : 
"COMPACT WITH THE UNITED STATES 
"The following ordinance shall be irrf>vorable witJwut the cousent of the· 
United State:; and t.he people of this :-;tate:-
"Second. Tha.t. the ·people inha.bjt.ing thi:;; stat·e do agref> and declare 
that they forever di~:~claim an right a:ntl title to the unappropria.trd publie 
lands lying within the l)otmdarie;; of this st<tte, and to all landR lying-
within said limits owned or held by a.n~· Indian or Indian tribl:':'>; and that 
until the titll:' thereto shall have been extit1guishl:'d by the United States, 
the :same :;hall be and remain subjl:'ct, to the di:sposition of tlw United 
Stat•e::~, and said Indian lands ~:~hall remain under the absolute jurisdiction 
and control of the congre;s of the U11ited States and tha.t the lands 
belonging to citizens of the United States residing withont the limits of 
this ~:~h1te shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the lands belonging to 
rPsidents thi:'I'eof; and that no taxes shall be imposed by the state on lands 
or property therein, belonging to or which may be hereafter purchased by 
the 1Jnited States or reserved for use: Provided, That nothing in this 
ordinance shall preclude the sta,te from taxing as other lands are ta.xl:'d any 
·lands owned or he)d by an Indian who has ::;evered his •tribal relations, and 
ha.:; obtah1ed from the United Statl:'s or from any person a title thereto by 
])l1tl:'nt or other grant, save and except such lands as have been or ma.y be 
grantf>d to an~· Indian or Indians under any act of eongres:s conta.ining a 
vrovision exempting the lands thus grantl:'d from taxation, which excPption 
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statute-that "the following ordinance shall be irrevocable 
without the consent of the United States and the people of 
the State of Washington." Its substantive terms mirror the 
language used in the enabling legislation. 
We have already noted that two distinct provisions of Pub. 
L. 280 are potentially applicable to States not granted an 
immediate cession of jurisdiction. The first, § 6, without ques-
tion applies to Washington and the seven other States admitted 
into the Union under enabling legislation requiring organic 
law disclaimers similar to that .i ust described. This much is 
clear from the legislative history of Pub. L. 280,25 as well as 
from the express language of § 6. That section provides 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act 
for the admission of a State, the consent of the United 
States is hereby given to the people of any State to 
amend, where necessary, their State constitution or exist-
ing statutes, as the case may be, to remove auy legal 
impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal juris-
diction in accordance with the provisions of this Act: 
Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become 
effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction 
by auy such State until the people thereof have appro-
priately amended their State constitution or statutes as 
the case may be." 
All other States were, as we have noted. covered by § 7. In 
that section Congress gave the consent of the United States 
"to any other State ... to assume jurisdiction at such 
time and in such manner as the people of the State shallr 
25 See H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Con g., 1st Sess. ( 1953). According to 
thif-l n'port. ttccompanying H. R. 1053 (the House wrsion of Pub. L. 280) 
t'exnminatwu of the Federal statutes and State constitutions has revealed 
that. t.Jw enabling act~ for eight States, and in con:sequence the con~:;titu­
tion:s of those States, contain express di:sclaimers of jurisdiction. Included 
are Arizon~t, .Montmw., New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, Utah, and Washington." !d., at 6. 
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by affirmative legislative action, obligftte and bind the 
State to the assumption thereof." 
These provisions appear to establish different modes of 
procedure by which an option State, depending on which 
flection applies to it, is to accept the Pub. L. 280 jurisdictional 
offer. The procedure specified in § 7 is straightforward: af-
firmative legislative action by which the State obligates and 
binds itself to assume jurisdiction. Section 6, in contrast, is 
delphic. · The only procedure mentioned is action by the 
people "to amend their constitutions or statutes, as the case 
may be" to remove any legal impediments to the assumption 
of jurisdiction. The phrase "where necessary" in the main 
· clause suggests that a requirement for popular-as opposed to 
legislative-action must be found if at all in some source of 
law independent of Pub. L. 280. The proviso, however, has 
a different import. 
B 
The proper construction to be given to the single inartful 
8entence in § 6 has provoked chapters of argument from the 
parties. The Tribe and the United States urge that notwith-
standing the phrase "where necessary," § 6 should be con-
strued to mandate constitutional amendment by disclaimer 
States. It is their position tha.t § 6 operates not only to grant 
the consent of the United States to state action inconsistent 
with the terms of the enabling legislatio11 but also to establish 
a distinct procedure to be followed by Enabling Act States. 
To support their position, they rely on the language of the 
proviso and upon certain legislative history of § 6.2G 
In the alternative, the Tribe and the United States argue 
that popular amendatory action, if not compelled by the terms 
of ~ 6, is mandated by the terms of the Enabling Act of 
Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4. Although they acknowledge that 
· · '{~ongress in § 6 did grant the "consent of the United States~' 
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required under the Enabling Act before the State could remove 
the disclaimer, they contend that § 6 did not eliminate the 
need for the "consent of the people" specified in the Enabling 
Act. In their view, the 1889 Act-if not Pub. L. 280-dictates 
that constitutional amendment is the only valid procedure by 
which that consent can be given. 
The State draws an entirely different message from § 6. 
It contends that the section must be construed in light of the 
overall congressional purpose to facilitttte a transfer of juris· 
diction to those option States willing to accept the responsibil-
ity. Section 6 was designed, it says, not to establish but to 
remove lega1 barriers to state action under the authority of 
Pub. L. 280. The phrase "where necessary" in its view is 
consistent with this purpose. It would construe the word 
"appropriately" in the proviso to be synonymous with "wQel'e 
necessary'·' and the entire section to mean that constitutional 
amendment is required only if "necessary" as a matter of 
state law. The Washington Supreme Court having found 
that legisla.tive action is sufficient to grant the "consent of 
the people" to removal of the disclaimer in Art. XXVI of the 
state constitution,27 the State argues that the procedural 
27 The validity of Chapter 36 was first challenged in the federal courts 
in Quinrwlt Tribe of Indians v. Gal.laghe1·. 368 F. 2d 648 (CA9 196{1). In 
Quinault. the Court of Appeal~ for the Ninth Cirrnit. held that under § 6 
and the Enabling Act the consent of the people to removal of the dis-
claimer need only be made in some manner "valid and binding under state 
law." !d., at, 657. Relying on the Washington Supreme Court's holding 
in State v. Pa·ul, 53 W. 2d 789 (1959), that legislative action would suffice, 
it concluded that Washington's assumption of jurisdiction was valid. 
When Chapter 36 was first challenged in the state courts, the Washington 
Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in State v. Paul. See Ma.kdh 
Indian Tribe v. State, 76 W. 2d 485, 457 P. 2d 590 (1969); 1'onasket v. 
State. ~4 W. 2d 164, 525 P. 2d 217 (1974). See al:so n. 16, ~'Upra. In 
M aka.h. the Comt. reasoned, as it 'had in Y:>auJ that the makers of the 
Washington Constitution intended that for purposes of Art. XXVI "the 
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requirements of § 6 have been fully satisfied. It finds the 
Enabling Act irrelevant since in its view § 6 effectively 
repealed any federal law impediments in that Act to state 
assertiou of jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280.28 
c 
From our review of the statutory, legislative. and historical 
materials cited by the parties, we are persuaded that Washing-
ton's assumption of jurisdiction by legislative action fully 
complies with the requirements of § 6. Although we adhere 
to the principle that the procedural requirements of Pub. L. 
280 must be strictly followed, Kennerly v. District Court, 400 
U.S. 423, 427; McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 
124, 180, and to the general rule that ambiguities in legisla-
tion affecting retained tribal sovereignty are to be construed 
in favor of the Indians, see, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 
U. S. 373, 392. those pnnciples will not stretch so far as to 
permit us to find a federal l'equirement affecting the mauner 
in which the States. are to modify their organic legislation on 
the basis of materials t11at are essentially speculative. Cf. 
Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343, 350-351. 
The lauguage of ~ - 6, its · legislative history, and its role in. 
Pub. L. 280 all clearly point the other way. 
·we turn first to the language of § 6. -·The main clause is 
490. In additwn, it relied on Quinault for the propo,-ition that under § ~ 
the con~tifutional disclaimer nefd be removt>d only by a mPthod binding 
under state law. In · 'l'onasket, the Wa,;hington court rea.ffirmPcl this 
rea,;;oning. It. also relied on the altPmaLe ground that the disclajmer in 
Art. XXVI could be con:;trucd not to pl'C'clude "criminal and civil rPgula.-
tion" on India.n lands and therefore would not, st.and as a ba.rricr to state 
jHrisdJCtion. 84 W. 2d, at. '177. 
2~ The State m;sert;-; as well that flw Wn~hington conRtitutional di"-
rlaimcr doe~ not, po~ any Rubf'tantive barrier to state a,<;:sumption of 
juru;dichon over ft>l' and unre:;tricted lands within the reservation. In 
l1ght of our holding that Washmgton hilS f<atisfied the procedural require-
ments for n•pealing the disclaimN, we need not com;idcr the scope of thjs 
:;tate eonsti tutionaJ provu:nou. 
77-388-0PINION 
WASHINGTON v. YAKIMA INDIAN NATION 21 
framed in permissive, not mandatory terms. Had the drafters. 
intended by that clause to mandate popula.r amendatory 
action, it is unlikely that they would have included the words 
"where necessary." As written, the clause suggests that the 
substantive requirement for constitutional amendment must 
be found i11 some source of law independent of § 6. The basic 
question , then, is whether that requirement can be found in 
the 1anguage of the proviso to § 6 or alternatively in the terms 
of the Enabling Act. 
We are unable to find the procedur·al mandate missing from 
the main clause of § 6 in the language of the proviso. That 
language in the abstract could be read to suggest that consti-
tutional amendment is a condition precedent to a valid 
assumption of jurisdiction by disclaimer States. Wheu exam-
ined in its context, however, it cannot fairly be read to impose 
such a condition. Two considerations prevent this reading. 
First, it is doubtfuf that Congress-in order to compel dis-
claimer States to amend their constitutions by popul~tr vote-
would have done so in a provision the first clause of which 
consents to that procedure "where necessary" and the proviso 
to which indicates that the procedure is to be followed if 
"appropriate." Second, the reference to popular amendatory 
action in the proviso is not framed as a cj.escription of the 
procedure the States must follow to assume jurisdiction. but 
instead is written as a condition to the effectiveness of "the 
provisious of" Pub. L. 280. When it is recalled that the only 
substantive provisions of the Act-other than those arguably 
to be found in § 7-accomplish an immediate transfer of juris-
diction to specifically named States, it seems most likely that 
the proviso was included to ensure that § 6 would not be con-
strued to effect an immediate transfer to the disclaimer group 
of option States. The maiu clause removes a federal law bar-
rier to any new state jurisdiction over Indian country. The 
proviso suggests that disclaimer States are not automatically 
· to ree-eive .vunisdiction by vittl.l.C' mf' .11hat removaL Withooit 
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the proviso, in the event that state constitutional amend-
ment were not found "necessary," 20 § 6 could be con-
strued as effecting an immediate cession. Congress clearly 
wanted all the option States to "obligate and bind" them-
selves to assume the jurisdiction offered in Pub. L. 280."0 To 
be sure, constitutional amendment was referred to as the 
process by which this might be accomplished in disclaimer 
States. But, given the distinction that Congress clearly drew 
between those States and automatic transfer States, this refer-
ence call hardly be construed to mandate that process. 
Before turning to the legislative history, which, as we shall 
29 Dif;claimer States have responded in diverse ways to the Pub. L. 280 
offer of Jurisdiction. See Goldberg, Pub. L. 280: The Limits of State 
Jurisdiction ' over Reservation Indian~, 22 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 535, 546-
548, 567-575. Only one-North Dakota-has amended its constitution. 
30 In Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U. S. 423, we emphao;ized the need 
for the responsible jurisdictions to "manife~t by political action [their] 
willingne~s and ability to discharge their new responsibilitjeo;." ld., at 427. 
Kennerl-y involved an attempt by the state courts of Montana to a~~ert 
civil jurisdiction over a transaction that occurred within reservation bound-
aries. The tribe had requested :state juri:sdiction, but the Stat,e had not 
obligated ito~elf to a:s:sum it. The ca~e was litigated on the theory that § 7 
obligated itself to assume it. The raHe wa~ litigated on the theory that § 7 
requirement of "a-ffirmative legislative action." Ibid. Two of our other 
cases involving Pub. L. 280 al:so illu~trate the need for respon~ible action 
under the federal :statute. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, we held that 
the State of Arizona-one of the disclaimt>r States-could not validly exer-
cise juri~diction over a civil action brought by a non-Indian against an 
Indian for a transaction that occurred on the N a.vaho Re:servation. We 
relied on the traditional principle that a State may not infringe the right 
of re~ervation Indian~ "to make their own law~ and be ruled by them" 
without an express authorization by Congress. Id., at 220. In Williams, 
the State had not atempted to comply with§ 6: the state court had taken 
jurisdiction without state statutory or con~titutional authorization. A 
sirmlar ~Jtuation obtained in McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 
Hi4 (1973). There we held that Arizona could not by simple legislative 
enactmt>nt tax incomf' earned by a Navaho from reservation source~. The 
tax statntt> at. is;;ue was not framed as a measure obligating the State to. 
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see, accords with this interpretation of § 6, we address the 
argument that popular amendatory action, if not a require-
ment of Pub. L. 280, is mandated by the legislation admitting 
Washington to the Union. This argument requires that two 
assumptions be made. The first is that § 6 eli:rninated some 
but preserved other Enabling Act barriers to a State's asser-
tion of jurisdiction over Indian country. The second is that 
the phrase "where necessary" in the main clause of § 6 was 
intended to refer to those federal law barriers that had been 
preserved. Only if ea,ch of these premises is accepted does 
the Enabling Act have any possible application. 
Since we find the first premise impossible to accept, we 
proceed no further. Admitting legislation is, to be sure, the 
only source of law mentioned in the main clause of § 6 and 
might therefore be looked to as a referent for the phrase 
"where necessary" in the clause. This reading, however, is 
not tenable. It supplies no satisfactory answer to the ques-
tion why Congress-in order to give the consent of the United 
States to the removal of state organic law disclaimers-would 
not also have by necessary implication coqsented to· the 
removal of any procedural constraints on the States imposed 
by the Enabling Acts. The phrase "notwithstanding the 
terms of any Enabling Act" in § 6 is broad-broad enough to 
suggest that Congress when it referred to a possible necessity 
for state constitutional amendment did not intend thereby to 
perpetuate any such requirement in an Enabling Act.. Even 
assuming that the phrase "consent of the people" in the 
Enabling Act must be construed to preclude consept by legis-
lative action-and' the Tribe and the United States have o£-
fered no concrete authority to support this restrictive reading 
of the phrase-:Jl we think it obvious that in the "notwith-
31 There is, for example, nothing in the legi~laJ.ive history of the 
Enabling Act to indicate that the "con~ent of the people" could be given 
only by a proce~s of constitutional amendment. The scant legi~lative 
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standing" clause of § 6 Congress me~jtnt to remove any federal 
impediments to state jurisdiction that may have bee11 created 
by all Enabling Act. 
The legislative history of Pub. L. 280 supports the con-
clusion that § 6 did not of its own force establish a state con-
stitutional amendment requirement a~1d did not preserve any 
such requirement that might be found in an Enabling Act. 
Pub. L. 280 was the first jurisdictional bill of general appli-
cability ever to be enacted by Congress. It reflected con-
gressional concern over law and order problems on Indian 
reservations and the financia1 burdens of continued federal 
jurisdictional responsibilities on Indian lands, Bryan v. Itasca 
County, 426 U. S. 373. It was also, however·, without ques-
tion reflective of the general assimilationist policy followed 
by Congress from the early 1950's through the late 1960's~32 
splitting the Dakota territory into lwo States and of admitting both imme-
dialt>ly to the Unjon . In none of thr,;e debatr::; was there any extended 
discu::;sion of tlw Indian land disclaimer or any indication that the "con~ 
sent. of the pt>ople" to removal of thr di;.;claimt>r could not be given by the 
people 's representatiws in t11e lrgblature. See Adver:sp Reports of the 
House Committee on the Territorit>:s, May 1886 and Feb. 1888, annt>xed to 
H . R. Rep . No. 1025, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-25 (1888). See abo, e. g., 
19 Cong. Rec. 2804, 2883, 3001, ·:m7 (1888); 20 Cong. Rec. 801, 869 
(1889) . The only explicit references to tlw dh;elaimer of authority over 
Indian lands are found in H. R: Rep. No. 1025, s'Upra, at 8-9 (calling 
att>ntion to fact that by the terms of the bill largt> Indian Reservations in 
the Dakota Territory "remain within the exclusive control and jurisdiction 
of tlw United States) and in 19 Cong. Rcc. 2832 (1888) (Oklahoma Dele-
gate objecting to the disclaimer) . 
at That policy was formally announced in H. R. Con . Res. 108, 67 Stat. 
B132, approved on July 27, 1953, the s111ne ·clay that Pub. L. 280 was 
passrd by tht> Hou~t> . 99 Cong. Rec. 9968, 83d Coug., 1st Sr~s. (195a). 
A~ statffi in H. R. Con. Res. 108, the policy of Congres::; was "as rapidly 
a;; possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limit:; of the United 
State~ subject to the same laws and entitlt>d to the same privileges and 
responsibilities as are applicable to othet· citizens of the United States, to 
end the1r status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of 
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See H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). See also 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the 
Interior & Insular Affairs Committee on H. R. 459, H. R. 
3235, and H. R. 3624, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). The failure 
of Congress to write a tribal consent provision into the trans-
fer provision applicable to option States as well as its failure 
to consult with the tribes during the final deliberations on 
Pub. L. 280 provide ample evidence of this.aa 
This policy reflt>cted a return to 1 he philmsophy of the General Allotment 
Act of 1187, ch. 119, S. 1, 24 Stat. 288, as amended 25 U. S. C. § 331 
(1970) , popularly known as the Dawes Act, a philosophy which had been 
rejected with the passage of the Indian lleorganization Act of 19:H, 48 
Stat. 984 
In Bryan v. Itasca Coutl,ty, 42() U. S. 373, the Court emphasized tha.t 
Pub. L. 280 was not a termination measure and should not be constrm>cl 
as such. Our discussion here is not to Uw contrary. Tlw parties agree 
that Pub. L. 280 reflected an assirnilationist philosophy. That Congress 
intended to facilihLt'e nssimilation when it authorized a tran~fer of .iurisdic-
tion from the Federal Government to the States does not necesf<!trily mean, 
bowever, that it intended in Pub. L. 280 to terminate tribal self-govern-
ment. lndeed, it may be that even after the transfer tribal courts retain 
roncurrent jurisdictiOn in areas in which they formerly shared jurisdiction 
with the Federal Goverument. 'The Tribe has urged that we so hold. 
This issue, however, is not wit11in tlw seope of our order noting probable 
juri::;diction, Het> n. 20, supra, and we do not ciPcide. it here. 
33 The;;e ft>ature::; of Pub. L. 280 have attracted extensive criticism. See 
generally Goldberg, 8Upra, n. 29. Indeed, the experience of the Yakima 
Nation i~ in itself sufficient to demonstrate why the Act has provoked S<f 
murh rritiCJsm. In 1952, in connection with the introduction of bills that 
proposPd a general jurisdictional transfer, RPe Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee ou Indian Affairs of the IntPrior & Insular Affairs CommittPe on 
H. R. 459, H. R a235, and H. R. 3624, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) (here-
mafter 1952 Hearings), a repre::seutat ive of thP Yakimas testified that the 
Tribe was oppo~ed to the exten,;ion of state jurisdictiou on the Yakima 
He•P rvatJOn. He Rtatcd : 
"The Yakima lndinus ... feel that in the State Courts they will not. be· 
I rc·atPd as well as thPy are in the FPciPral courts, becausp the:; believe that 
many of the citizens of the State arr still prPjudiced against tlw Indians. 
"They are now .tmder the .Federal laws amc[ have their own trify.l] Jawsr,. 
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Indeed, the circumstances surroundiHg the passage of Pub. 
L. 280 in themselves fully qear out the State's general thesis 
that Pub. L. 280 .was intended to facilitate, not to impede, 
the trausfer of jurisdictional ·responsibility to the States. 
Pub. L. 280 originated in a series of individual bills intro-
duced in the 83d Congress to transfer jurisdiction to the five 
willing States who eventuaily were Covered in § § 1 and 4.'14 
H. R Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). 'Those bills 
were consolidated into H. R. 1063. which was referred to the 
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Committee 
for consideration. Closed hearings on the bill~ were held be-
fore the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs on June 29 and 
July 15, 1953.H5 During the opening session on June 29, 
customs, and regulations. This system is working well and the Yakima 
Tribe believes that it should be continued and not changed at this time:" 
1952 Hearings, at 84-85. 
In 195:3, when the Indian Affairs Subcommittee of the Hou~e Committee 
on Indian Affairs considered the final version of Pub. L. 280, the Commit-
tee was again aware that the Yakima Nation oppo~;ed state jurisdiction. 
The House He port accompanying H. H. 1063 containl:l a lPtter from the 
Department of the Interior listing the Tribe as among tho;;!" oppo;;ed to 
· ''b=ing ::;ubjected to State jurisdiction" and having ll "tribal law-and-o1·der 
organization that functions .in a rea;;onably sa.tisfactory manner." H. R. 
848, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1953). Had Washington been included among 
thE' mandatory States, it is thus quite possible that the Yakima Re~erva­
tion would have been excepted. 
34 Similar bills had been introduced in the 82d Congress, and in public 
hearing~:~ held on those the idea of a. general trau:;fer was di:;cu,;sed at 
length. See 1952 Hearings, supra, n. :31. 
Hn See Unpublished Transcript of Hearings 6'11 H. R. 1063 before the Snb~ 
committee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior & Insula;r 
Affairs on June 29 and July 15, 1953 (hereinafter cited as .June 29 Hear-
mgs, and July 15 Hearings.) The transcript of these hearings was firllt 
made available to this Comt by the United Statell during the briefing of 
Tonasket v. Washington, 411 U.S. 451. It was again supplied in B1·yan v. 
Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, and for thi~:> appeal ha,; been reproduced in 
full 111 the Appellee',; Appendix. Thelle hearing~:>, along with the House 
Report on H. R. 1063 a~:> amended, H . R . Rep~ No. S48, 8:3d Cong., I,;t 
. 
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Committee Members, counsel, and representatives of the De-
partment of the Interior discussed various proposal designed 
to give H. R. 1063 general applicability. June 29 Hearings 
1-16. It rapidly became clear that the Members favored a 
general bill. Ibid. At this point, Committee counsel noted 
that several States "have constitutional prohibit~ons aga.inst 
jurisdiction." !d., at 17. There followed some qiscussion of 
the manner in which these States should be treated. On 
July 16, a version of ~ 6 was proposed. July l5 Hea.rings 
23. After further discussion of the disclaimer problem, the 
"notwithstanding" clause w~s added, id., at 27, and the lan-
guage eventually enacted as ~ 6 was approved by the Com-
mittee that day. The speed and the context alone suggest 
that § 6 was designed to remove an obstacle to state jurisdic-
tion, not to create one. And the discussion at the hea.rings, 
which in essence were mark-up sessions, makes this clear. 
On July 15, committee counsel presented a.n amendment 
which was eventually to become § 6. He explained th~ effect 
of the amendment as follows : 
"[T] he legislation as acted upon by the committee would 
apply to only five states. The two additional section 
amendments would apply first to eight states having con-
stitutional or organic law impediments and w,ould grant 
the consent of the United States for them to remove such 
impediments and thus to acquire jurisdiction. 
"The other amendment would apply to any other 
Indian states ... who would acquire jurisdiction at such 
time as the legislative body affirmatively indicated their 
desire to so assume jurisdiction." July 15 Hea.rings, 
at 24. 
ImmPdiately after the proposed § 6 was read to the subcom-
rnittee, the Chairman, Congressman D'Ewart, commented: 
SP~8 . (1053) and the Senate RPport, which is virtually identical, S. Rep. 
No. 699, 83d Cong. , hit Se.s;;. (1953) , constitute the primary lcgi:slative 
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"I do not think we have to grant permission to a state 
to amend its own statutes. Id., at 25. 
Committee counsel replied: 
"Mr. D'Ewart, I believe the reason for this is that in 
some instances it is spelled out both in the constitution 
and the statutory provisions as a result of the Act and it 
may be unnecessary, but by some state courts it may be 
interpreted as being necessary." !d., at 26. 
The version of § 6 read to the Committee members by 
counsel contained no reference to the Enabling Acts but 
merely granted consent for the States to remove existing 
impediments to the assertion of jurisdiction over Indians. It 
was suggested that in order effectively to authorize the States 
to modify their organic legislation the clause should be more 
specific. 'This suggestion resulted in the proposal of the 
"notwithstanding" clause. 'The following exchange then took 
place : 
" [C'ommittl'!e counsel]: I believe that the clause "not-
withstanding any provisions of the Enabling Act" fol' 
such states might well be inCluded. It would make clear 
that Congress was repealing the -:Enabling Act. 
" [Congressman Dawson] -: -to give permission to amend 
their constitutions. 
" I Committee counsel]: I think that would help clarify 
the intent of the committee at the present time and of 
Congress if they favorably acted on the legislation." Id., 
at 27. 
The next day, July 16, the Committee filed its report on the 
substitute bill. H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 
·(1953) . 'The report explains that§ 6 would 
"give consent of the United States to those States pres-
ently having organic laws expressly disclaiming jurisdic-
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tion to acquire jurisdiction subsequent to enactment by 
amending or repealing such disclaimer laws." us 
The Committee hearings thus make clear an intention to 
remove any feder_al barrie~~ to the assumption of jurisdiction 
by Enabling Act States. They also make clear that that con-
sent was not to effect an immediate transfer of jurisdiction. 
While some Committee members apparently thought that§ 6 
States, as a matter of state law, would have to amend their 
constitutions iu order to remove the disclaimers found there,37 
there is no indication that the Committee intended to impose 
any such requirement. 
We conclude that § 6 of Pub. L. 280 does not require dis-
claimer States to amend their constitutions to make an 
effective acceptance of jurisdiction. We also conclude that 
any Enabling Actrequirement of this nature was effectively 
repealed by § 6. If a~ a matter of state law a constitutional 
amendment is required, that procedure must--as a inatter of 
state law-be foiiowed. And if under state law a constitu-
tional amendment is not required, disclaimer States must still 
take positive action before :Pu·~. L. 280 jurisdiction can become 
effective. The Washington Supreme Court having deter-
mined that for purposes of the repeal of Art. XXVI of the 
Washington Constitution legislative action is sufficient,as and' 
appropriate state legislation having been enacted, it follows 
ao ThP Housp pas,;ed the bill without dPbate on ,luly 27, 195:3. 99· Cong. 
Rec. 9962-9963 (1953). In thr Senat(', the bill was refrrrNI to the Com-
mJttep on Intf'rior and In,;ular Affair~. 99 Cong. Rrc. 10065 (1953). 
That CommittPe held no hearings of it~ own, and it r('port('d out thr bill 
two days later without amendment. 99 Cong. Rec. 10217 (195:3). The· 
bill received only brief consideration on the SenatP floor beforP it wa:; 
passed on August 1, 1953. 99 Cong. Rec. 10783-10784 (1953). 
37 SrP .June 29 Hearings at 17; .July 15 Hearings, at 24-28 . 
. ~~The Tribe has intimated that the Washington Supreme Court 'R hold-
ing is incorrect. 'How('ver, thP procPdnre by which tlw disclaimer might 
be rPmoved or repealed-Congress having :pven its con::;ent,.-is is we I1aviit 
held a question uf state Jaw. 
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that the State of Washington has satisfied the procedural 
requirements of § 6. 
IV 
We turn to the question whether the State was authorized 
under Pub. L. 280 to assume only partial subject-matter and 
geographic jurisdiction over I1~dian reservations within the 
State.39 
The argument that P\lh. L. 280. does not permit this scheme 
of partial j uri.sdiction relies primarily upon the text of the· 
federal law. The main contention of the · Tribe and the 
United States is that partial jurisdiction, because not specifi-
cally auth_orized, must therefore be forbidden. In addition, 
they assert that the interplay between the provisions of 
Pub. L. 280 demonstrates that ~ 6 States are required. if they 
assume ltny jurisdiction, to assume as much jurisdiction as was 
transferred to the mandatory States.40 Pointing out that 18 
au Bbth parties find support for thPii' po~itions on this issue in the legis-
lativP h~ory of the arnendmE>nt~ to Pub. L. 280 in Title IV of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 73. The 1968 legislation provides that 
States that have not extendE-d criminal or civil }urisdiction to Indian 
cotthtry ran makr future extem;ions on!~· with the consent of the tribes 
affected. 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321 (a). 1322 (a.) . The amendments also pro-
vide explicitly for partial assemption of jurisdiction. Ibid . In addition, 
they authorizE' tlw United StatE'S to accPpt retroce~:~sions of jurisdiction, 
full or partial, from thE' mandatory and the § 7 States. 25 U. S. C. 
§ 1323 (a) . Section 7 itsE'If was rPpealed with t.he provil:lo that the repeal 
was not intE>nded to affE>ct any ce:;~ion made prior to the repeal. 25 
U. S. C. § 1323 (b). Section 6 was re-enacted without change. 25 
u. s. c. § 1324. 
We do not rely on the 1968 legisla.tion or its history, finding tlw latter 
equivocal, and mindful that the issues in t,hi8 case are to be determine-d 
in accord with legislation enacted by CongrE'~S in 1953. 
"10 Since Pntire reservations were exempted from coverage in three of the 
man<l:tt ory Statf'l:i, thP Tribe and the United States concPde that the option 
States could probably a::>~:~ume juri::>diction on a re~:~ervation-by-reservation 
basis. The UnitE'd StatE'S a]:-;o conredP~ that the word "or" in § 7 might 
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U. S. C. § 1151 defines Indian count1'Y for purposes of federal 
jurisdiction as including an entire reservation notwithstanding 
"the issuance of any fee patent," they reason that when Con-
gress in § 2 transferred to the mandatory States "criminal 
jurisdiction" over "offenses committed by or against Indians 
in Indian country," it meant that all parts of Indian country 
were to be covered. Similarly, they emphasize that civil juris-
diction of comparable scope was transferred to the mandatory 
States. They stress that in both ~§ 2 and 4, the consequence 
of state assumption of jurisdiction is that the state "crimina1 
laws'' and "civil laws of general application" ftre henceforth 
to "have the same force and effect within . .. Indian country 
as they have elsewhere in the State." Finally. the Tribe aJJd 
the United States contend that the congressional purposes of 
eliminating the jurisdictional hiatus thought to exist on Indian 
reservations, of reducing the cost of the federal responsibility 
for jurisdiction on 'tribal lands, and of assimilating the Indian 
tribes into the general state popula.tion are disserved by the 
type of checkerboard arrangement permitted by Chapter 36. 
We agree, however, with the State of Washington that 
statutory authorization for the state jurisdictional arrange-
ment is to be found in the very words of ~ 7. That provision 
permits option States to assume jurisdiction "in such manner" 
as the people of the State shall "by affirmative legislative 
action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof." 
Once the requirements of § 6 have been satisfied, the terms or 
§ 7 provide the substantive scope of jurisdiction permitted to 
disclaimer States. The phrase "in such manner" in ~ 7 means 
at least that any option State can condition the a.ssumption 
of full jurisdiction on the consent of an affected tribe. A1id 
here Washington has done no more than refraiu from exercis-
ing the full measure of allowable jurisdiction witqout consent 
of the tribe affected. 
Section 6, as we have seen. was placed in the Act to elim-
inate possible organic law barriers to the assumption of 
· jurisdiction by disclaimer .States. ·· 'The Tribe and the United 
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States ackllowledge that it is a procedural not a substantive 
section. The elause contains only one reference of relevance 
to the ()artial jurisdiction question. '·This is the phrase "as~ 
sumption of civil or criminal jurisdiction in accordance with 
the provisions of this Act." . ·As both parties recognize, this 
phrase necessarily leads to other "provisions" of the Act for 
clarification of the substantive scope of the · jurisdictional 
grant. The first questiou then is which other "provisions" of 
the Act govern. The.second is what constraints those 1'provi-
sions" place on the jurisdictional arrangements made by 
option States. 
The Tribe and the United States argue as an initial matter 
that § 7 is not one of the "provisions" referred to by § 6. 
They rely in pa.rt upon the contrast between the phrase 
.Hassumption of civil and criminal jurisdicti01i" in § 6 and the 
disjunctive phrase 1'crimina1 offenses or civil causes of action" 
in § 7. From this distinction betweewthe "civil and criminal 
jurisdiction" language of ~ 6 and the optional language in § 7, 
we are asked to conclude that § 6 'States must assume full 
jurisdiction in accord with the terms applicable to the man-
datory States even though § 7 States are permitted mot"e 
discretion. We are unable to accept 'this argument, not only 
because the statutory language ·does not fairly support it, but 
also because the legislative· history is wholly to the contrary. 
It is clear from the Committee hearings that the States 
covered by § 6 were, except for the possible impediments 
contained in their organic laws, to be treated on precisely the 
same terms as option States.'1 1 
Section 6, as we have seen, was essentially an afterthought 
designed to accomplish the limited purpose of r·emoving any 
barrier to jurisdiction posed by state organic law disclaimers 
of jurisdiction over Indians. All option States were originally 
treated under the aegis of § 7.42 · The record of the Committee 
4 1 See .June 24 and July 15, supra, n. 35. 
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heanngs makes clear that the sole purpose of § 6 was to 
resolve the disclaimer problem. 13 Indeed, to the extent that. 
the Tribe and the United States suggest that disclaimer States 
st11nd on a difierent footing from all other option States, their 
argument makes no sense. It would ascribe to Congress an 
intent to require States that by force of organic law barriers 
may have had only a limited involvement with Indian country 
to establish the most intrusive presence possible on Indian 
reservations, if any at all, and at the same time an intent to 
allow Rtates with different traditions to exercise more restraint 
in extending the coverage of their law. 
The Tribe and the United States urge that even if, as we 
have concluded, all option States are ultimately governed by 
§ 7, the reference in that section to assumption of jurisdiction 
"as provided for in the Act" should be construed to mean that 
the automatic transfer provisions of §§ 2 and 4 must still 
apply. The argument would require a conclusion that the 
option States stand on the same footing as the mandatory 
States. Their view is not persuasive. The mandatory States 
were consulted prior to the introduction of the single-state 
bills that were eventually to become Pub. L. 280. All had 
indicated their willingness to accept whatever jurisdiction 
Congress was prepared to transfer. This, however, was not 
the case with the option States. Few of those States had 
been consulted, and from the June 29 and July 15 hearings it 
is apparent that the drafters were primarily concerned with 
establishing a general transfer scheme that would facilitate, 
not impede, future action by other States . willing to accept 
jurisdiction. It is clear that the all-or-nothing approach sug-
gested by the Tribe would impede even the most responsible 
and sensitive jurisdictional arrangements designed by the 
States. To find that under Pub. L. 280 a State could not 
exercise partial jurisdiction, f'Ven if it were willing to extend 
"H &x•, e. g., July 15 He:1ring,~, ttl 24. 
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full jurisdiction at tribal request, would be quite inconsistent 
with this basic history . . 
The language of § 7, which we have found applicable here, 
provides, we believe, surer guidance to the issue before us:H 
The critical language in § 7 is the phrase permitting the 
assumption of jurisdiction "at such time and in such manner 
as the people of the State shall . . . obliga.te and bind the 
State to the assumption thereof." Whether or not ('in such 
manner" is fully synonymous with "to such extent," the 
phrase is at least broad enough to authorize a State to condi-
tion the extension of full jurisdiction over an Indian reserva-
tion on the consent of the tribe affected. 
The United Sta.tes argues that a construction of Pub. L. 280' 
which permits selective extension of state jurisdiction allows 
a State to "pick and choose" orily those subject-matter areas 
and geographical parts of reservations over which it would 
like to assume responsibility~ ·congress, we are told, passed 
Pub. L. 280 not as a measure to · benefit the States but to 
reduce the economic buraens associated with federal jurisdic-
tion on reservations, to respond to a perceived hiatus in law 
enforcement protections avaihible to tribal Indians, ;and to 
achieve a11 orderly assimilation of Indians into the general 
population. That these were the major concerns underlying 
the passage of Pub. L. 280 cannot be doubted. See n ·ryan v. 
Itasca Cty., supra, 426 U.S., at 379. 
But Chapter 36 does not reflect an a.ttempt to reap the 
benefits and to avoid the burdens of the jurisdictional offer· 
made by Congress. To the contrary, the State must assume 
total jurisdiction whenever a tribal request is made that it 
do so. Moreover, the partial geographic and subject-matter 
14 Tlw 1968 amendments, which re-enacted § 6 without change as 25 
U. S. C. §1324 but repealed §7, 25 U.S. C. §132:~ (b), and added sub-
;;tnntive jurisdictional provision~ covering "any ~tate," see 25 U. S. C. 
§§ 1321, 1322, sugget:~t that in the ft1tl\f!~ the, ScQJJe of jurisdiction for alL 
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jurisdiction that exists in the absence of tribal consent is 
responsive to the law enforcement concerns that underla.y the 
adoption of Pub. L. 280. State jurisdiction is complete as to 
all non-Indians on reservations and is also complete as to 
Indians on nontrust lands. The law enforcement hiatus that 
preoccupied th~ 83d Congress has to that extent been elimi-
nated. On trust and restricted lands within the reservations 
whose tribes have not requested the coverage of state law, 
jurisdiction over crimes by Indians is, as it was when Pub. L. 
280 was enacted, shared by the tribal and federal govern-
ments. To the extent that this shared federal and triba.I 
responsibility is inadequate to preserve law and order, the 
tribes need only request and they will receive the protection 
of state law. 
The State of Washington in 1963 could have unilaterally 
extended full jurisdiction over crimes and civil causes of action 
in the entire Yakima Reservation without violating the terms 
of Pub. L. 280. We are unable to conclude th;:J..t the State, in 
asserting a less intrusive presence on fhe Reservation while at 
the same time obligating itself to assume full jurisdictional 
responsibility upon request, somehow flouted the will of 
Congress. A Sta.te that has accepted the jurisdictional offer 
in Pub. L. 280 in a way that leaves substantial play for tribal 
self-government, under a voluntary system of partial jurisdic-
tion that reflects a responsible attempt to accommod~te the 
needs of both Indians and non-Indians within a reservation, 
has plainly taken action within the terms of the offer made 
by Congress to the Sta.tes in 1953. For Congress surely did 
not deny 1111 option Sta.te the power to condition its offer of 
full jurisdiction on tribal consent. 
v 
Having concluded that Chapter 36 violates neither the pro-
cedural nor the substantive terms of Pub. L. 280, we turn, 
finallyl to the question whether the "checkerboard" fattern 
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of jurisdiction applicable op the reservations of nonoonsen.t--
ing tribes is on its face invalid under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmeut.4 " The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit coucluded that it is, reasoning 
that the land-title classification is too bizarre to meet "any 
formulation of the rational basis test." 552 F. 2d, ~t 1135. 
The Tribe advances several different. lines of ar~ument in 
defense of this ruling. 
First. it argues that the classifications implicit in Chapter 
36 are racial classifications, "suspect" under the test en unci-
ated in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, and that they 
cannot stand unless justified by a compelling state interest . 
. Second, it argues that its interest in self-government is a 
fundamental right, and that Chapter 36-as a law abridging 
this right-is presumptively invalid. Finally, the Tribe 
argues that Chapter 36 is in valid even if reviewed under the 
more traditional equal protection criteria articulated in such 
cases as Massa(;husetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 
307.'10 
'1" The Court of Appeals did not di~turb the finding of the District Court 
that Chapter 36 had not been a.pplil'cl on the Yakima Heservation to dis-
criminate again~t the Tribe or any of its members. The District Court 
found that the governmental legal s<>rvire~ available to the Trib<> and its 
membrrs were not sigiilficantly diffrrrnt from tho;;e offered to other rurul 
and c1ty residents of Yakima County. It also concluded that the distinc-
tions drawn between non-Indianr:. and Indians in the statute were not 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. In view of these findingt>, our 
inquiry hrre is limited to the narrow que;;tion whether the distinctions 
drawn in Chapter 36 on their face violate the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
46 The Court of Appt>al~ limited itR holding to the land-tenurt> classifi-
ea1ion. The Tribe, in support of the judgment, has argued that thE:' Chap-
tl•r :36 cla:ssificatiom; bas!:'d on llw tribal statu~ of the offeudpr and on 
whPt hPr a juvenile IS involved arc abo facially invalid . In our view t hr~e 
status classifications of Chapter :36, arc· indiHtingui~hablr from the inter-
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We agree wtih the Court of Appeals to the extent that its 
opinion rejects the first two of these arguments and reflects 
a judgment that Chapter 36 must be sustained a.gainst an 
Equal Protection Clause attack if the classifications it employs 
"rationally further the purpose identified by the State." 
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 
314. It is settled that "the unique legal status of Indian 
tribes under federal law" permits the Federal Government to 
enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that 
might otherwise be constitutionally offensive. Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U. S. 535. 551- 552. States do not enjoy this 
same unique relationship with Indians, but Chapter 36 is not 
simply another state law. It was enacted iu response to a 
federal measure explicitly designed to readjust the allocation 
of jurisdiction over Indians. The jurisdiction permitted under 
Chapter 36 is, as we have found, within the scope of ~he 
authorization of Pub. L. 280. And many of the classifications 
made by Chapter 36 are also made by Pub. L. 280. ·Indeed, 
classifications based on tribal status and laud tenure inhere 
in many of the decisions of this Court involving jurisdictional 
controversies between tribal Indians and the States, see, e. g., 
McBratney v. United States, supra. For these reasons, we 
find the argument that such classifica.tions are "suspect" an 
untenable one. The contention that Chapter 36 abridges a 
"fundamental right" is also untenable. It is well-established 
that Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian 
affairs. may restrict the retained sovereign powers of the 
Indian tribes. See, e. g., United States v. Wheeler, - U. S. 
ln enacting Chapter 36, Washington was legislating 
under explicit authority granted by Congress in the exercise 
of that federal power.47 
The question that remains, then, is whether the lines drawn 
41 This is not to hold that Pub. L. 280 was a lt>rmination mea~ure. 
Whether there is concurrent tribal unci ::;tate .iunHdiction on ~:;ome are~t:> m· 
t.he H.est>rvatioo is an llisue we ciD not cfeei'cfe:. Sel' n. :32:, Slhpra.. 
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by Chapter 36 fail to meet conventional Equal Protection 
Clause criteria, as the Court of Appeals held. Under those 
criteria, legislative classifications are valid unless they bear 
no rational relationship to the State's objectives. Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, at 307. State 
legislation "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
merely because the classifications [it makes] are imperfect." 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485. Under these 
standards we have no difficulty in concluding that Chapter 36 
does not offend the Equal Protection Clause. 
The lines the State has drawn m'ay well be difficult to ad-
ministRr. But they are no more or less so than many of the 
classifications that pervade the law of Indian Jurisdiction. 
See Seymour v. Superintendent, 386 U. S. 351; Moe v. Salish 
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463. Chapter 36 is fairly cal-
culated to further the State's interest in providing protection 
to non-Indian citizens living within the boundaries of a reser-
vation while at the same time allowing scope for tribal self-
government on trust or restricted lands. The land-tenure 
classification made by the State is neither an irrational or 
arbitrary means of identifying those areas within a reserva-
tioJl in wihch tribal members have the greatest interest in 
being free of state police power. Indeed, many of the rules 
developed in this Court's decisions in cases acccommodating 
the sovereign rights of the tribes with those of the States are 
strikingly similar. See, e. y., Untied States v. M cBratney, 
I!Jupra; Draper v. United States, supra; Williams v. Lee, supra,· 
M cClan,ahan v. Arizona, supra. In short, checkerboard juris-
diction is not novel in Indian law, and does not, as such, vio-
late the Constitution. 
For the reasons set out in this opinion, the judgment of the 
C'ourt of Appeals is reversed. 
1 t is so ordered. 
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